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NOT THE SMALLEST GRAIN OF INCENSE:
FREE EXERCISE AND CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION TO DRAFT REGISTRATION'
I shall die, but that is all I shall do for Death;
I am not on his pay-roll. 2
INTRODUCTION
America has long respected the beliefs of conscientious objectors to military
service. States have exempted conscientious objectors from service in their
militia since colonial times,3 and every federal conscription statute since the
Civil War has exempted conscientious objectors from personally bearing arms.4
The historical accommodation to the demands of conscience suggests that, even
in wartime, conscientious objectors make unique, positive contributions to the
community and deserve respect and accommodation.'
1. "The early Christians refused to put a pinch of incense on the altar before Caesar's image,
knowing that if they were to recognize the State in this way their lives might be spared." A. LYND,
WE WON'T Go: PERSONAL ACCOUNTS OF WAR OBJECTORS 33 (1968).
2. E. ST. VINCENT MILLAY, Conscientious Objector, in WINE FROM THESE GRAPES 47 (1934).
3. See S. KOHN, JAILED FOR PEACE: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN DRAFT LAW VIOLATORS,
1658-1985 5-15 (1986) [hereinafter JAILED FOR PEACE] (detailing provisions for conscientious
objectors in pre-revolutionary American colonies). However, in some colonies the exemption was
gained only after conscientious objectors engaged in civil disobedience. Id. at 6-7.
4. The first federal draft statute during the Civil War did not specifically exempt conscientious
objectors. However, the statute permitted a person could avoid military service if he provided a
substitute to serve in his place or paid $300 for the hiring of a substitute. Act of March 3, 1863,
ch. 75, § 13, 12 Stat. 731, 733 (1863). The law was amended in 1864 to exempt from the draft
conscientious objectors who were "members of religious denominations ... prohibited from [bearing
arms] by the rules and articles of faith and practice of said religious denomination.' Act of Feb.
24, 1864, ch. 13, 13 Stat. 6, 9 (1864).
5. See Boulding, The Pacifist as Citizen, FRIENDS JOURNAL, Nov. 1989, at 14 (positive social
functions of pacifists include providing critique of national policies in light of highest moral values
of the civilization; providing checks and balances on state decisionmaking regarding war; providing
concrete visions of what will happen when the war is over; and indicating an alternative way of
dissenting from government policies while remaining loyal to the country); Freeman, A
Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 806, 827-30 (1958) (suggesting seven positive
functions that conscience performs in civilized society); Hochstadt, The Right to Exemption from
Military Service of a Conscientious Objector to a Particular War, 3 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv'. 1,
30 (1967) (suggesting that individual's acting consistently with conscience gives essential moral
content to society's need to discern and give meaning to ultimate moral truths).
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On the other hand, the legal accommodation of conscientious objectors has
to a certain extent been grudging. Narrow eligibility requirements have
excluded many conscientious objectors whose bases for objecting to war were
deemed less worthy of protection.6 Similarly, the alternatives to military
service required of conscientious objectors are often equally offensive to
conscience and may require a sacrifice by the conscientious objector greater than
that required of his arms-bearing brethren.7 Some conscientious objectors have
been subjected to imprisonment and torture for exercising their beliefs!5
6. During the Civil War, for example, only members of religious denominations that prohibited
members from bearing arms were exempted from serving in combat. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13,
13 Stat. 6, 9 (1964). Similarly, during the First World War, only members of a "well-recognized
religious sect ... whose creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form"
were exempted from combatant military service. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76,
78 (1917) (repealed 1919).
The draft laws from 1940 to the present day exempt only those who "by reason of religious
training and belief, [are] conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Act of June
24, 1948, ch. 625, § 60), 62 Stat. 604, 612-13 (1948) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456j (1988));
Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885, 889 (1940)).
Thus, one whose religious beliefs permit participation in a "just" war, but not an unjust one,
is not protected by the statutory exemption. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(denying claim that limiting conscientious objector exemption to objectors to all wars violates the
Establishment Clause). See generally J.ROHR, PROPHETS WITHOUT HONOR: PUBLIC POLICY AND
THE SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR 103-83 (1971).
7. See supra note 6 (alternatives available to conscientious objectors during the Civil War).
During the First World War, conscientious objectors were required to submit to induction into
the military where they were assigned non-combatant roles. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40
Stat. 76, 78 (1917) (repealed 1919). Those who refused to be inducted were imprisoned. L.
SCHLISSEL, CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA 150-59 (1968).
From the Second World War to the present day, conscientious objectors were required to
perform either non-combatant service in the military or work under civilian supervision "contributing
to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest...." 50 U.S.C. app. § 456j (1980). See
also 32 C.F.R. § 1656 (1990) (regulations relating to alternative service for conscientious objectors).
Conscientious objectors have generally been required to perform their alternative service away
from their home communities and at very low or no pay. See L. BASKIR & W. STRAUSS, CHANCE
AND CIRCUMSTANCE: THE DRAFT, THE WAR, AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION 41 (1978). During
the Second World War, conscientious objectors were paid nothing for their labor and the burden of
supporting them and their families fell to their churches. See M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, CONSCRIPTION
OF CONSCIENCE 216-24 (1952). For a critical discussion of why conscientious objectors were not
paid for their service, see J. CORNELL, CONSCIENCE AND THE STATE: LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROBLEMS OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS, 1943-44 40-49 (1944).
Furthermore, even though the conscientious objector is required to perform the same two year
term of alternative service as does the draftee, the conscientious objector is not eligible for federal
veterans' benefits. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (upholding denial of veterans
benefits to conscientious objector who had completed two years alternative service).
8. During the First World War, conscientious objectors who refused to submit to military
discipline were imprisoned and some were tortured. See L. SCHLISSEL, supra note 7, at 150-59
(detailing specific instances of brutality towards conscientious objectors in prison); JAILED FOR
PEACE, supra note 3, at 52-54 (detailing mistreatment of conscientious objectors in prison during
the First World War).
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As generally understood, conscientious objection to war describes a
conscientious or religious belief incompatible with participation in war.'
Conscientious objection is not a monolithic ideology, however. Rather, the term
describes a range of religious beliefs and attitudes that generally concern a
person's relationship with the state in time of war.'" Precisely what conduct
constitutes participation in war is an individual judgment that varies from
objector to objector.
For many conscientious objectors, even the act of registering for the draft
is morally incompatible with their religious beliefs opposing participation in
war." Despite these claims, the Military Selective Service Act requires all
9. In this note, the words "conscience" and "conscientious" will be used interchangeably with
"religion" and "religious." The terms will be used to refer to "deeply held moral, ethical, or
religious beliefs" that would give the holder of such beliefs "no rest or peace" if he or she acted
contrary to them. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970).
The belief that war is immoral may be based on the teachings of a recognized religious
tradition or may develop in an individual's own conscience independent of any organized religious
teaching. See infra text accompanying notes 110-117 (discussing various sources of religiously based
opposition to war).
10. The philosophical basis of conscientious objection to war dates back at least to the time of
Lao-tze, 500 B.C.E. For the first 250 years of the Christian era, Christians were almost without
exception conscientious objectors not only because of their opposition to shedding blood, but also
because military service was closely connected with the worship of idols and the emperor. M.
SIBLEY & P. JACOB, supra note 7, at 1-2.
Professor Elise Boulding has identified at least four varieties of citizens who call themselves
pacifists: Internationalists (who advocate international cooperation and nonviolent methods of conflict
resolution but who support military action by their own government in wartime); selective pacifists
(who object to participating in unjust wars but who are willing to fight in just wars); conscientious
objectors (who cooperate with the government in wartime by participating in alternative service but
who refuse military service or to take a life); and absolutists (who not only refuse to participate in
war and violence but who also refuse to assist the government's warmaking capacity in any way).
Boulding, supra note 5, at 13-14.
The Department of Justice distinguished twelve classes of conscientious objectors during the
Second World War: religious, moral or ethical, economic, political, philosophical, sociological,
internationalist, personal, neurotic, naturalistic, "professional" pacifist, and Jehovah Witness
objectors. Not all of these categories of conscientious objectors were eligible for exemption under
the draft law. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYsTEM, SPECIAL MONOGRAPH No. 11: CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION 3-4 (1950) [hereinafter SPECIAL MONOGRAPH NO. 11].
See also M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, supra note 7, at 18-43 (discussing the "community of
conscientious objectors" and describing in detail the idiosyncratic beliefs of seven religious and one
"philosophical and political" group of objectors); Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause,
83 HARV. L. REv. 327, 338 n.44 (1969) (psychological examination of Second World War
conscientious objectors revealed many sources and commitments of conscientious objection).
11. One such conscientious objector described his belief in the following letter to the Selective
Service System:
I am writing to inform you that I have violated the Military Selective Service Act
by not registering. I feel that I must refuse to comply with this law because registering
would force me to compromise my Christian faith.
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young men, including conscientious objectors, to personally register regardless
of their moral objection to doing so. 2 In the past, federal courts have held
that the registration requirement is valid, even as applied to conscientious
objectors, because registration is a necessary prerequisite for the orderly
administration of the conscientious objector exemption. a The Supreme Court,
however, has never definitively decided whether requiring conscientious
objectors to register for the draft violates their constitutional right to free
exercise of religion.
After Congress abolished conscription in 1973,14 President Ford rescinded
the registration requirement in 1975.15 Consequently, the constitutionality of
requiring conscientious objectors to register for the draft, as well as other
constitutional challenges to the draft, became dormant questions. 6 When
President Carter reinstated draft registration in 1980,"7 however, thousands of
I believe that war in any form is wrong. Christ meant for Christians to love each
other and to love their enemies. War is an expression of hatred and an institution that
has legalized and encouraged types of violent conduct that no civilized country would
allow within its borders during peacetime. The use of force to resolve disputes has
created an atmosphere of coercion which directly conflicts with the message of love
preached by Christ. A Christian must use truth, love, understanding, and equality to
resolve any disputes in which he is involved. As a Christian, I feel that I must avoid
participation in the conscription process by not registering because conscription is an
inherent part of the war process....
I am not opposed to serving this great land of ours by working in a hospital,
teaching, or by working at some other type of public service job. However, I can not
participate, in any manner, with the armed forces.
Letter of Mark Schmucker (Aug. 19, 1980) reprinted in Reilly, "Secure the Blessings of Liberty":
A Free Exercise Analysis Inspired by Selective Service Non-registrants, 16 N. KY. L. REv. 79, 85
(1988). See also infra text accompanying notes 205-44 (extensive discussion of Schmucker's case).
12. 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1988). "[l]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United
States ... between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to
registration ... as shall be determined by proclamation of the President by rules and regulations
prescribed hereunder." Id.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 148-72 (discussing federal cases upholding draft
registration requirement against free exercise challenges).
14. Pub. L. No. 92-129, 85 Stat. 353, 50 U.S.C. app. § 467(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
15. Proclamation No. 4360,32 C.F.R. 33 (1976), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 453 (1988).
16. One case, Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), was filed in 1971 by young men
challenging on the male-only draft on equal protection grounds. A district court panel was convened
to hear the case in 1974 after Congress allowed Selective Service's authority to induct men into the
military lapsed. The case languished for five years and was revived only when President Carter
used his authority to reinstate draft registration in 1980. Id. at 60-61. Rostker eventually reached
the Supreme Court which held that a male-only draft did not violate the equal protection. See infra
notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
17. Proclamation 4771 of July 2, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 247 (1980). Statutory authority for the
president to institute registration is found at 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1988) and the regulations at 32
C.F.R. §§ 1615 et seq. (1990).
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young men refused to register 8 reviving the question of whether conscientious
objectors could be constitutionally required to register for the draft. More
recently, the American-led war against Iraq and the commitment of 400,000
American troops to Saudi Arabia has made conscientious objection and the draft
important matters of contemporary public debate. 9
Although the threat of criminal prosecution has always made it difficult for
conscientious objectors to refuse registration, prior to 1980 objectors could at
least take solace in the fact that they could apply for and receive the
conscientious objection exemption soon after registration.' By applying for
conscientious objection status simultaneously with registration, the conscientious
objector could provisionally remove himself from the pool of men eligible to be
drafted."' Registration could therefore be fairly characterized as an
administrative process by which the conscientious objector could claim his
exemption, thus justifying the infringement on free exercise as the least
restrictive means consistent with the government's interest.2
Selective Service procedures enacted after the 1980, however, made draft
registration a more complicated moral decision for conscientious objectors.
Under current Selective Service regulations, no provision exists for conscientious
objectors to declare their opposition to military service at registration; they may
18. In 1982, an estimated 674,000 young men had failed to register as required. Two hundred
seventy of these informed the government of their conscientious opposition to registration and were
referred to the Justice Department for prosecution. Thirteen were subsequently indicted. The
remainder either registered under pressure, were found to be not required to register, or were still
under investigation. By 1984, three additional conscientious objector non-registrants had been
indicted. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 604 n.3 (1985).
By 1986, however, Selective Service reported that 99.2% of those required to register have
signed up. SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., SEMIANNUALREPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1986) [hereinafter SEwMANNUAL REPORT 1986].
19. See Seligman & de Llosa, The Return of Conscience, FORTUNE, Feb. 25, 1991, at 149
(reporting that Nexis news service offered eighty-seven stories about conscientious objection during
the first twenty-six days of January, 1991). See also The draft is ready for war, POST-TRIBUNE
(GARY, IND.), Dec. 16, 1990, at A8, col. 1 (citing questions by Sen.-Nunn and Glenn whether the
Pentagon would have enough personnel worldwide if a combat breaks out in a war against Iraq).
20. Kellett, Draft Registration and the Conscientious Objector: A Proposal to Accommodate
Constitutional Values, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167, 170 (1984).
21. Id. The conscientious objector applicant would remain ineligible for military service until
his local draft board considered his application and placed him in the appropriate classification
category.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 165-67 (describing court decisions holding draft
registration a reasonable means of administering the conscientious objector exemption despite the
infringement on free exercise).
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apply for an exemption only if and when they receive induction notices.'
Until that time, the conscientious objector is not differentiated from other
registrants and is presumably available for induction.2
This procedure subtly but profoundly transforms draft registration from
being the first step of withdrawing from the military to the first step of entering
military service. The procedure has led some conscientious objectors to refuse
to register, even though they would be willing to register for the draft if there
were some way to officially declare their opposition to war.'
This note will explore two unsettled questions regarding the legal status of
conscientious objectors. First, does the Constitution require that conscientious
objectors be exempted from military service? Second, if the answer to the first
question is yes, does the right extend to being exempted from draft registration?
This note will argue that the history of the conscientious objector exemption and
modern free exercise jurisprudence support the proposition that conscientious
objection is protected as free exercise of religion under the Constitution. This
note further argues that under current circumstances, the failure to exempt or
otherwise accommodate conscientious objectors from draft registration violates
their right to free exercise of religion. Finally, the note will discuss and
evaluate several alternatives that would provide the constitutionally required
accommodation of the conscientious objector.
Part I of this note will analyze how the Supreme Court has decided cases
involving free exercise of religion challenges to other government regulations
to determine the analytical framework within which conscientious objection
should be examined.' Part II outlines the constitutional history of
conscientious objection, applies the Court's free exercise analysis to
conscientious objection to military service, and demonstrates that the
Constitution requires that conscientious objectors be exempted from compulsory
military service.' Part III examines draft registration under the Court's free
exercise analysis to show that, as currently constituted, requiring conscientious
objectors to register is an unconstitutional infringement on the free exercise of
23. 32 C.F.R. § 1636.2 (1990). Draftees have ten days from the time the induction notice is
mailed within which to claim any exemptions for which they may be eligible, including conscientious
objection. 32 C.F.R. § 1633.2 (1990).
24. 32 C.F.R. § 1633.3 specifies that "no document relating to any registrant's claims or
potential claims will be retained by the Selective Service System and no file relating to a registrant's
possible classification status will be established prior to that registrant being ordered to report for
induction." Id.
25. See infra note 227 (reporting on one non-registrant who would have registered if afforded
the opportunity to indicate his conscientious objection on the registration form).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 36-95.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 96-147.
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religion.' Finally, Part IV will examine several ways in which the right to
conscientious objection could be protected and will propose a policy change
which would simultaneously protect the right to conscientious objection while
meeting the government's needs purportedly served by draft registration?
PART I: FREE EXERCISE ANALYSIS
In a country such as the United States that is both highly regulated and
religiously diverse, individual citizens often face conflicts between the demands
of government and their consciences. The supporters of the Bill of Rights
sought to restrain the government's natural tendency to assert its sovereignty
over the individual's conscience by adopting the first amendment to the
Constitution and forbidding the government from interfering with the free
exercise of religion.'
Despite the founders' intentions, the Free Exercise Clause has not prevented
the state from making political, economic, and social demands that conflict with
the consciences of individuals. The United States Supreme Court has had many
occasions to resolve these conflicts, and, in doing so, has fashioned a
considerable body of constitutional law and analysis regarding the meaning and
limits of freedom of religion.3 Despite the unequivocal language of the
amendment and its explicit reference to the exercise of religious beliefs, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Free Exercise Clause as absolutely
prohibiting only government interference with or proscription of religious belief
as such; the clause does not, the Court has repeatedly said, absolutely protect
religiously motivated conduct.'
Until recently, the Court has generally required the government to show a
"compelling interest" in enforcing the law against a religious objector to justify
the interference with religious practices.33 In the recent case of Employment
28. See infra text accompanying notes 148-220.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 221-46.
30. "Congress shall make no law respecting establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
The Free Exercise Clause was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
31. See infra notes 36-95.
32. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986). "Our cases have long recognized a distinction
between the freedom of individual belief, which is absolute, and the freedom of individual conduct,
which is not absolute." Id. See also Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res.of Oregon v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990) (Smith I1) (emphasizing the same point).
33. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The "compelling interest" in free exercise
analysis is the same standard of review applied to cases involving classifications based on race and
government restrictions on the content of speech. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of
Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (1990) (Smith 11).
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Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,' however, the
Court refused to require a compelling interest to enforce a law that made the
religious use of peyote illegal." Smith suggests that the Court may take a
radically different approach to free exercise claims in the future, an approach
that reverses the historical presumption in favor of religious liberty. This
section of the note will first describe the Court's historical approach to free
exercise cases, and then will discuss Smith and how it may be reconciled with
the Court's previous analysis.
A. Traditional Free Exercise Analysis
In Sherbert v. Verner' the Supreme Court adopted a three part test to
determine whether a government statute or regulation may be enforced against
a person religiously opposed to it. The first part of the test is to determine
whether the regulation in fact burdens the exercise of a sincerely held religious
belief." Once the burden on free exercise is established, the government must
demonstrate a sufficiently compelling interest in order to enforce the regulation
against the religious objector.' Finally, even if the government's interest is
compelling, the government must show that exempting the religious objector
would "render the entire statutory scheme unworkable before it could enforce
the statute or regulation."" The following sections discuss each part of the
Sherbert test in detail.
1. Burden on Free Exercise
The first step is to demonstrate that such a conflict actually exists. An
individual who seeks to be exempted from a generally applicable regulation must
first prove that th6 regulation in fact restricts his or her right to freely exercise
a sincerely held' religious or conscientious belief.4" The belief need not be
34. Smith 11, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
35. See infra notes 76-85.
36. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Sherbert involved a Seventh-Day Adventist who was denied
unemployment compensation because she refused to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. Id. at 401.
37. Id. at 403-06.
38. Id. at 406-08.
39. Id. at 409.
40. The courts have generally conceded to religious objectors the sincerity of their beliefs, but
have considered evidence demonstrating or challenging the objector's sincerity. See, e.g., Quaring
v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd by equally divided court per curiam sub nom.,
Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (woman whose interpretation of the Second
Commandment's prohibition against making graven images prevented her from having her
photograph taken for a driver's license was allowed to show that she possessed no photographs of
herself or her family, did not own a television set, refused to allow household decorations that
depicted flowers or other natural objects, and removed or obliterated labels from food items that
displayed pictures on them as evidence of the sincerity of her belief.); Dobkin v. District of
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orthodox or traditionally religious to warrant protection, but it must be
something more than a subjective "philosophical and personal" opinion. 2 The
Court has interpreted the phrase "by reason of religious training and belief" in
the statute exempting conscientious objectors from the draft to mean beliefs that
"function as a religion" in the person's life or are "deeply held moral, ethical,
or religious beliefs [that] would give ... no rest or peace" to the holder of such
beliefs if she acted contrary to them.43
Once the objector demonstrates the sincerity and religious nature of the
belief, she must then show that the problematic regulation in fact burdens the
free exercise of that belief.M A burden on free exercise exists if the law tends
to coerce the believer to act contrary to conscience. That is, a law may impose
penalties for failing to perform an act that is contrary to one's religious beliefs,
Columbia, 194 A.2d 657 (D.C. App. 1963) (Court admitted evidence that lawyer worked in his
office on Saturday to show insincerity of his claim of religious objection to appearing in court on
the Sabbath.)
A belief is not insincere merely because other members of the same sect do not share it,
Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981); is newly
adopted, Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987); or because the
person may be "struggling" with his or her beliefs, unable to articulate them with the "clarity and
precision" of a more sophisticated person, Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
The courts may not, however, inquire whether the belief is in fact valid or true. See United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (defendants charged with fraudulently representing that they
were recipients of divinely inspired messages and solicited memberships in their religious movement
based on those messages; Supreme Court held that the trial judge properly kept from the jury the
question whether the defendants actually were divine messengers).
Men believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be
incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals
does not mean that they can be suspect before the law.... The religious views espoused
by [the defendants] might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if
those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or
falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the trier
of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain.
Id. at 86-87.
41. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713. "Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free
Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion." Id.
42. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1971) (suggesting that Henry David Thoreau's
rejection of contemporary social values were "philosophical" and did not "rest on a religious base").
43. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344, 340 (1970). Although this case dealt with
interpreting § 456G) of the Military Selective Service Act, it is reasonable to assume that any
definition of "religion" for purposes of the first amendment would have to, at least, include the
functional equivalent of the definition in Welsh.
44. Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
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coercing the believer to commit acts that violate conscience4 ; or the law may
impose penalties for performing an act compelled by religious belief but
prohibited by law, coercing the believer to abstain from performing a religious
duty.'
The burden need not be a directly imposed penalty such as a fine or
imprisonment. Conditions placed upon receipt of an important government
benefit may be a burden on free exercise if the conditions tend to coerce the
believer to compromise the religious belief in order to receive the benefit.47
For example, in the landmark case of Sherbert v. Verner,' the Court
recognized that denying a woman unemployment compensation for refusing to
45. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (requiring Amish employers to pay
social security taxes on their Amish employees in violation of the employer's religious beliefs that
doing so implies a lack of trust in God); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (fining Amish
parents for failing to send their children to school beyond the eighth grade when doing so would
destroy a religiously based, agrarian way of life); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)
(requiring conscientious objector to serve in the military); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) (expelling elementary school students who refuse to salute the flag in violation
of the biblical prohibition against worshiping graven images); United States v. Schmucker, 815 F.2d
413 (6th Cir. 1987) (requiring a conscientious objector to register for the draft); In re Janison, 375
U.S. 14, on remand, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963) (requiring jury duty of one religiously
opposed to sitting in judgment of others).
46. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (using
peyote as a sacrament in religious ceremonies contrary to state criminal law); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (using children to proselytize in obedience to biblical commands
but contrary to child labor laws); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (practice of
polygamy demanded by religious teachings but contrary to state civil law); People v. Woody, 61
Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (using peyote in religious ceremonies contrary
to state criminal law).
47. See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (denying welfare benefits to a child whose
parents who refuse to apply for a Social Security number because doing so would rob the child of
her spiritual power); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying an income
tax exemption to a college whose religious belief prohibits interracial dating); Thomas v. Review
Bd. of Ind. Employment See. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (denying unemployment compensation to
a person who refuses to produce military equipment in violation of his religious belief); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denying unemployment compensation to a person who will not work
on her Saturday Sabbath); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (expelling students from a
state university for refusing for religious reasons to enroll in mandatory military training); Alexander
v. Trustees of Boston University, 766 F.2d 630 (1 st Cir. 1985) (denying federal educational benefits
to students who refused to certify that they were in compliance with the Military Selective Service
Act due to their conscientious opposition to cooperating with the draft in any way); Quaring v.
Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), affid by equally divided court per curiam sub nom., Jensen
v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (denying a driver's license to a person refusing to have a
photograph taken in violation of the biblical injunction against graven images).
48. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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accept employment on her Sabbath was a sufficient infringement on free exercise
of religion to warrant first amendment protection.49
Thus, where civil or criminal penalties are imposed on religious practice,
or where religiously offensive conditions are placed on important government
benefits, the Court has generally found that the free exercise of religion has been
burdened. A final category of burdens on free exercise arises when government
practices offend the sensibilities of believers or makes a religious practice more
difficult but do not impose a penalty or deny a benefit.' In these cases, the
Court has distinguished between regulations that only incidently affect an
objector's "personal spiritual development""' -- which are not afforded
constitutional protection -- and those which tend to coerce the objector to
compromise the beliefs, which are protected.52 Only coercive regulations are
subject to first amendment scrutiny. Regulations that do not tend to coerce
simply do not present a conflict with the free exercise of religion and are valid
unless arbitrary or capricious."
49. Justice Brennan wrote:
The ruling [denying unemployment compensation] forces her to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the
free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
worship.
Id. at 404.
50. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(building a road on government-owned land, destroying sacred lands essential to the religious
practice of Native Americans); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (allowing the government to
assign and use a Social Security number to a child receiving welfare benefits against the religious
beliefs of her parents); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (requiring a person to close his
shop on Sunday, when the person's religious community also requires his shop to be closed on
Saturday).
51. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
52. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
53. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 429, 450-51 (1988).
The Court's distinction between coercive and incidental infringements on free exercise was
illustrated in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). Roy, a practitioner of a Native American
religious tradition, objected to the requirement that he apply for a Social Security number for his
infant daughter before she could get food stamps on the grounds that assigning her a unique number
would "rob her of her spirit." Id. at 696. When a clerk at the welfare office administratively
assigned a number to his daughter, he asked the federal district court to prohibit the government
from using the number in administering the welfare benefits. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the government's assignment and use of a Social
Security number did not burden Roy's free exercise of religion. "Roy may no more prevail on his
religious objection to the Government's use of a Social Security number for his daughter than he
could on a sincere religious objection to the size or color of the Government's filing cabinets." Id.
at 700.
However, at least five justices wrote that if the government had not assigned the number
administratively, the father could not be constitutionally required to apply for a number as a
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2. Compelling Government Interest
Under the traditional Sherbert free exercise analysis, when an individual has
proven that a law burdens his or her free exercise of religion, the law cannot be
enforced against the individual unless the government can demonstrate that doing
so is necessary to accomplish a sufficiently important state interest.54 The key
to balancing an individual's religious liberty and a government regulation,
therefore, is the nature and weight of the government's asserted interest in a
regulation. 5
Unfortunately, the Court has not been consistent in defining or weighing the
government's interests in free exercise cases.' Professor Tribe suggests that
the Court's decisions can best be reconciled by considering the government's
interests as falling into three categories.57 In some cases, the Court has given
great weight to the government's interest in maintaining the separation of powers
and avoiding judicial interference with decisions made by other branches of
government.' Thus, the Court deferred to Congress' decision to exempt
Amish employees but not their Amish employers from paying Social Security
taxes, 9 the Air Force's decision to require a Jewish psychiatrist to remove his
yarmulke while on duty,' and a prison's work regulations that prevented
condition of receiving benefits. Id. at 724 (O'Connor, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Id. at 733 (White, I., dissenting) (stating that Free Exercise
Clause forbids the government from conditioning receipt of benefits on Roy's application for a
number contrary to his religious beliefs); Id. at 722 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the result) (holding that the issue of requiring the Roys to apply for a number before receiving
benefits is moot due to the government's having assigned the Social Security Number but stating that
recent free exercise cases suggest that benefits could not be denied based on religious objection to
a condition).
The Court relied on the distinction it made in Roy in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). Recognizing the danger of "measuring the effects of a
governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development," the Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause did not prevent the government from building a road on its own property even
though the road destroyed the sacred lands of a Native American tribe. "[The Free Exercise Clause
is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the
individual can exact from the government." Id. at 451 (citation omitted).
54. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). ("It is basic that no showing merely of a
rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive
constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation [on First Amendment rights].'"). 1d. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945)).
55. Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 429-31
(1986).
56. Id.
57. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1264-75 (1988).
58. Id. at 1264.
59. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
60. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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Muslims from attending weekly religious services,6 despite the interference
these policies placed on individual religious liberty. 6
2
In a second category of cases, the Court analyzed the government's interest
in the specific programmatic goals advanced by the particular regulation.' For
example, the state's interest in protecting the health and safety of children was
held as sufficiently compelling to justify giving blood transfusions to children
against the religious beliefs of their parents.' Similarly, the Court has found
the government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination sufficient to justify
revoking a tax exemption from a religiously-affiliated university that prohibited
interracial dating.'
Finally, in a third group of cases, the Court merged its analysis of the
government interest with the third part of the Sherbert test by inquiring whether
the government had a compelling interest in universal enforcement of the
regulation.' Under this narrow formulation, the judicial inquiry is whether
exemption or accommodation of the religious objector would unacceptably
burden the entire regulatory scheme. Accordingly, administrative difficulty,67
speculative fears that an excessive number of religious objectors may apply for
an exemption," the desire to avoid detailed inquiry by employers into job
applicants' religious beliefs,' and the fear that those exempted will become a
burden on society,' have all been found insufficiently compelling to justify
infringement on free exercise rights of individuals.
61. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
62. The Court itself did not purport to weigh the government's interest in Goldman and O 'Lone,
however. In those cases, the Court said that military and prison contexts require special deference.
Therefore, the Court said it will not hold the government to the compelling interest standard when
military or prison regulations are challenged on free exercise grounds. See O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
63. L. TRIBE, supra note 57, at 1267-72.
64. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). See also Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding conviction of Jehovah's Witness who violated child
labor law by directing her daughter to sell literature in obedience to religious instruction).
65. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
66. L. TRIBE, supra note 57, at 1272-75.
67. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1127(1984), affid by equally divided court per curiam
sub nom., Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) (administrative difficulty of finding alternative
means of identifying a driver does not justify denying a drivers license to a woman who refused on
religious grounds to have her picture taken).
68. Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981)
(discussing unemployment compensation).
69. Id.
70. Wisconsinv. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224-25 (1972) (regarding state requirement of schooling
to age 16).
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3. Effects of a Religious Exemption
Even if the government can show that its general interest in the regulation
is compelling, the traditional analysis also requires the government to
demonstrate that it could not accommodate the religious objection without
jeopardizing the state's interest.7' One important factor in the Court's analysis
is whether the state makes exceptions in enforcement of the regulation for
reasons other than religion. 2 Where the government exempts some persons
from its regulation, it will have difficulty proving that exempting religious
objectors would also frustrate its legitimate interests. A mere showing that
exempting religious objectors would be difficult or expensive is insufficient.
The government must show that exemption would "render the entirely statutory
scheme unworkable. "'
Thus, under the traditional analysis, when a government regulation tends
to coerce an individual to compromise a religious belief, the interests of the
government must be weighed against the individual's interest in religious liberty.
The balancing process always begins with a weighty presumption on the side of
religious liberty. Whether religious liberty must give way to the state's interest
depends on weight of the government's interest.74 The government's interest
in enforcing the regulation against the individual will not outweigh the
individual's interest unless exempting religious objectors would unacceptably
frustrate the regulatory scheme.
75
71. Thomas, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). "The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by
showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest." Id. at
718.
72. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). If a state creates a mechanism for individual
exemptions from a regulation, "its refusal to extend an exemption to an instance of religious
hardship suggests a discriminatory intent." Id. at 708. See also Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1526, 1603 (1990) (compelling reason is required to
refuse to accommodate persons for whom a regulation imposes a "religious hardship" when the state
has in place a system of individualized exemptions); Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (1984),
affd by equally divided court per curiam sub nom., Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985)
(Nebraska's argument that requiring a photograph for a driver's license serves a compelling state
interest is without merit since the state already exempts other classes of persons from having
photographs on certain classes of driver's licenses).
73. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
74. Clark supra note 10, at 344.
[T]he interest weighed on the individual's side of the balance in free exercise cases is
always the same in kind, that is, the interest in avoiding punishment of an act which is
compelled by conscience. However, the degree to which this interest exists-that is, the
intensity of the compulsion-can be evaluated only as a factual matter of the belief at
issue. Consequently, the law can measure only the weight of the government interest,
and not the individual interest.
Id.
75. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
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B. The Smith Analysis
The continued vitality of the Court's traditional free exercise analysis was
seriously challenged by the Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.76 The Smith case
concerned whether a state is required to pay unemployment benefits to members
of a bona fide church who use peyote in their religious ceremonies when a state
criminal statute prohibits possession of peyote.' The United States Supreme
Court refused to apply the Sherbert-compelling interest analysis to the criminal
statute prohibiting peyote.' The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did
not require an exemption for religious users of peyote and therefore affirmed the
denial of unemployment benefits to the men who were fired for using the drug
in religious ceremonies."
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected the Sherbert-
compelling interest analysis in cases where a generally applicable, religiously
neutral government criminal statute interfered with an individual's religious
practices.' Justice Scalia noted that, despite the twenty-seven year
history of the Sherbert analysis, the Court has never applied it to invalidate
76. llOS. Ct. 1595 (1990).
77. Id. at 1598.
78. Id. Although the case was brought as an unemployment compensation claim, its tortured
procedural history led the court to base its ultimate decision on the applicability of the criminal
statute. The case began with a claim for unemployment benefits by two members of the Native
American Church who were fired from their jobs in a private drug rehabilitation organization after
they were discovered as having used peyote in religious ceremonies. The Employment Division of
the Department of Human Resources denied the men unemployment benefits because their use of
peyote was "work related 'misconduct'". 110 S. Ct. at 1597-98.
On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution's Free Exercise
Clause prohibited Oregon from denying the benefits based on conduct which, although prohibited
by state criminal law, was religiously motivated and for which no compelling reason to enforce the
statute against religious users was found to exist. Smith v. Employment Div., Dept. of Human
Resources, 301 Or. 209, 217-19, 721 P.2d 445, 449-50 (1986).
Oregon appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case
to determine whether Oregon's criminal statute prohibiting possession of peyote exempted religious
users of the drug. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S.
660, 670 (1988) (Smith 1).
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court once again held that while the sacramental use of
peyote was not explicitly exempted from the state criminal statute, the Free Exercise Clause of the
United States Constitution prohibited enforcing the criminal statute against religious users of peyote.
307 Or. 68, 72-73, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988).
Oregon again appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Court reversed. 110 S. Ct.
1595 (1990) (Smith f).
79. 110 S. Ct. at 1598. The Court reasoned that if the state is not required to exempt religious
users of peyote from its criminal statute it need not exempt them from the "lesser burden" of
denying them unemployment compensation. Id. (quoting Smith 1, 485 U.S. 660, 670).
80. Smith I1, 110 S. Ct. at 1603.
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enforcement of a regulation against a purely free exercise claim outside of the
unemployment context."1 Using the compelling interest test makes sense in
unemployment cases, Justice Scalia noted, only because the statutory process
itself requires an individualized governmental assessment of the applicant's
eligibility for benefits.' Aside from the unemployment context, Justice Scalia
wrote, a compelling interest has been required only when a free exercise claim
has been paired with another constitutional right such as free speech 3 or
parental rights to educate children." The Court held that only in these
"hybrid" cases is the compelling interest test required.85
C. Resolving Sherbert and Smith
Although the Court seemed to radically change its free exercise analysis in
Smith, and although Justice Scalia's opinion evidenced little sensitivity for the
importance of religious liberty as a paramount constitutional value,s6 the Court
81. Id. at 1602.
82. Id. at 1603.
83. Id. at 1601. The Court cited cases implicating both free speech and freedom of religion,
including Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) and Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573
(1944) (licensing requirements for religious solicitation; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1944) (taxation of religious solicitation); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (mandatory flag salutes); and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (automobile license
plates displaying religiously objectionable slogan).
84. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1601. These cases included the right to send children to parochial
schools (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)) and the right of parents to stop their
children's formal schooling at the eighth grade (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
85. 110 S. Ct. at 1602. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
86. Justice Scalia described the accommodation sought by the Native Americans in Smith as "a
private right to ignore generally applicable laws" which is, in his words, "a constitutional anomaly."
Id. at 1604.
Justice Scalia wrote that minority religious groups may rely on the legislative political process
to protect their religious practices from infringement but that the Constitution does not require such
accommodation. 110 S. Ct. at 1606. He then wrote:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at
a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Id.
Earlier in the opinion, he characterized the presumption that a generally applicable regulation
of conduct is invalid as applied to a religious objector unless the regulation protects an "interest of
the highest order" as a "luxury" that "we cannot afford." Smith 1I, 110 S. Ct. at 1605.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, wrote in dissent: "I do not
believe the Founders thought their dearly bought freedom from religious persecution a 'luxury,' but
an essential element of liberty - and they could not have thought religious intolerance 'unavoidable,'
for they drafted the Religion Clauses precisely in order to avoid that intolerance." 110 S. Ct. at
1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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did not explicitly overrule Sherbert. Therefore, Smith and Sherbert must be
reconciled to determine the present free exercise analysis being used by the
Court.
The Court explicitly retained the Sherbert-compelling interest analysis
where a free exercise claim also implicates another constitutionally protected
right, the so-called "hybrid" claim.' Because much religious conduct is
expressive in nature, any regulation that regulates or forbids religious speech'
or requires speech contrary to religious beliefse is still subjected to the strict
compelling interest test. Similarly, the Smith Court recognized that the
fundamental right of parents to supervise the education and upbringing of their
children is often intimately tied to religious belief, and in such cases the Sherbert
test must be met.9'
The second area in which Smith leaves the Sherbert analysis intact is where
the regulatory scheme was designed for individualized assessment of each
applicant's eligibility. 9' Unemployment compensation is perhaps the
paradigmical example of statutory regimes that have built-in mechanisms for
reviewing the eligibility of each applicant. To refuse to accommodate the
religious objector who refuses to work on Saturday, for example, while
providing benefits to one who cannot accept certain work for medical or familial
reasons, would suggest an unconstitutional hostility towards religion.' In
contrast, the Court noted, are criminal laws which are generally applicable to
everyone.' While the legislature may presumably accommodate the beliefs of
religious minorities by granting a statutory exemption from otherwise generally
applicable criminal statutes, the Court held that the Constitution does not require
such an exemption.' Therefore, even after Smith, the government must
demonstrate a compelling interest to enforce a regulation against a religious
87. See supra notes 83-85.
88. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 900 (1940) (invalidating religious solicitation
licensing system that gave administrator too much discretion to deny a license to any group he did
not consider to be "religious" and therefore denied religious speech).
89. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (enjoining prosecution of a person
who, for religious reasons, covered up religiously offensive slogan on automobile license plate on
the grounds that the slogan constituted compelled speech); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (mandatory flag salute by school children).
90. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1601-02 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
91. Smith!!, 110S. Ct. at 1603.
92. Id. (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
93. Id.
94. See id., 110 S. Ct. at 1606 ("[A] society that believes in the negative protection accorded
to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well. It is
therefore not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for
sacramental peyote use.").
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objector when the regulatory scheme contains a system of individualized
assessment. 95
Therefore, it may be said that after Smith the government need not show
a compelling interest to enforce generally applicable laws against religious
objectors where (1) the objection is based solely on free exercise of religion and
does not implicate another constitutional right; and (2) the law does not provide
for a system of individualized review and assessment. Sherbert would still
control, however, where (1) the law interferes with free exercise of religion and
at least one other constitutional right; or (2) the law provides for an
individualized assessment of applicability. In such cases, the government may
enforce the law only if it can show that the law is necessary to meet a
compelling governmental interest of the highest order and exempting the
individual conscientious objector would render the statutory scheme unworkable.
PART II: APPLYING THE FREE EXERCISE ANALYSIS TO COMPULSORY
MILITARY SERVICE BY CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
A. Supreme Court Consideration of Conscientious Objection
The Supreme Court first upheld Congress' power to draft citizens into a
national army in Selective Draft Law Cases.' Even though that case contained
a free exercise challenge to the draft, the Court denied the challenge without
analysis. The Court simply dismissed the "unsoundness" of the free exercise
95. Id.
A third possible distinction between Smith and Sherbert is the difference between laws that
require religiously offensive conduct and laws that prohibit conduct required by religion. Smith dealt
with the latter: a law that forbade conduct that was required by claimants' religious beliefs. In a
practical sense at least, a law forbidding persons to worship a golden calf is more onerous than a
law requiring persons to worship a golden calf. In the first instance, true believers in the golden
calf could presumably continue to worship in private and escape punishment, but in the second case
failure to bow down could be more easily detected. By increasing the probability of being detected,
the law requiring golden calf worship is more burdensome than the prohibitory law forbidding calf
worship. While presumably the law should treat both types of infringement of free exercise
identically, the increased burden of the compulsory law may require a higher burden on the part of
the government to justify the infringement with free exercise.
96. 245 U.S. 366 (1918). The federal government's power to draft citizens into the army was
first upheld in Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 295 (1864). Kneedler did not involve a free exercise
challenge to the draft, however.
Selective Drafi Law Cases combined six cases challenging the constitutionality of the federal
draft. The Court focused most of its opinion on the challenge to Congress' authority to draft an
army, the opponent's claim being that the reference to "armies" in article I, section 8 of the
Constitution referred only to a professional standing army and not to calling out the militia which
were creatures of the states. 245 U.S. at 382. The Court rejected this line of reasoning as
"confounding the constitutional provisions concerning the militia with that conferring upon Congress
the power to raise armies. [The argument] treats them as one while they are different." Id.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 [1991], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol25/iss3/5
1991] C.O.s AND DRAFT REGISTRATION 473
challenge as being too "apparent" to require anything more than its summary
dismissal.'
The next cases dealing with conscientious objection to war dealt with
pacifists whose naturalization petitions were denied because they refused to
promise to bear arms in defense of the country. These cases, known as the
"Macintosh trilogy" after the leading case,' dealt primarily with the Court's
interpretation of the Naturalization Act and not the Free Exercise Clause per
se.9 Though not necessary to its holding which rested on its interpretation of
the statute, the Court stated in dictum that the conscientious objector exemption
was not required by the Constitution; therefore, denying citizenship to pacifists
certainly could not be unconstitutional."re The Court has subsequently cited
the Macintosh dictum as supporting the conclusion that the conscientious
97. 245 U.S. at 389-90.
98. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). The other cases were United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929) and United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931).
99. Among other things, the Naturalization Act required petitioners for naturalization to swear
an oath promising to "support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same." Macintosh, 283
U.S. at 614.
The preliminary naturalization application form contained Question 22 which asked: "If
necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?" Id. at 617. Macintosh
answered that there were some circumstances under which he would not bear arms. Id. at 617-18.
His application was rejected on the grounds that his qualified answer to the question indicated that
he could not in good faith take the statutory oath of allegiance to the United States. Id. at 613. The
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision interpreting the statute to require an
unqualified promise to bear arms to become a naturalized citizen. Id. at 626-27.
100. In Macintosh, the petitioner argued that the first amendment guaranteed conscientious
objectors the right to be exempted from military service, and that his qualified answer to Question
22 merely indicated that he might exercise that right. Id. at 618-19. The Court rebuked this
argument:
This ... is an astonishing statement. Of course, there is no such principle of the
Constitution .... The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms
in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only
because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him. The alien,
when he becomes a naturalized citizen, acquires with one exception [the right to be
elected president] every right possessed under the Constitution by those citizens who are
native born; but he acquires no more.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 623-24.
Even more astonishing, perhaps, was the Court's holding in Schwimmer that the petitioner,
a 48-year old woman who could not have enlisted in the army if she had tried, could be barred from
citizenship because of her pacifism. Here, the Court held that Question 22 dealt with more than
simply a willingness of the individual petitioner to bear arms but went to the political effect of
granting citizenship to pacifists in general. "Whatever tends to lessen the willingness of citizens to
discharge their duty to bear arms ... detracts from the strength and safety of the Government."
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 650.
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objector exemption instead exists solely by the grace of Congress and is not
required by the Constitution. t
The Court expressly overruled Macintosh in Girouard v. United States, °2
basing its decision on a different interpretation of the Naturalization Act. The
Court did not, however, address the constitutional issue of whether the first
amendment required conscientious objectors to be exempted from the draft." 3
Instead, the Court adopted the reasoning of Chief Justice Hughes' dissent in
Macintosh and recognized that bearing arms was not the only way a citizen
could defend the country.""° Thus, while Girouard overruled Macintosh's
interpretation of the Naturalization Act, it did not address the Macintosh dicta
which said that the Constitution does not require the conscientious objector
exemption from the draft. 05
101. Two subsequent cases dealing with conscientious objectors relied on the Macintosh dictum
for their results and have never been explicitly overruled. In Hamilton v. Regents, the Court held
that the Constitution did not prohibit a state university from expelling students who, for religious
reasons, refused to enroll in mandatory courses of military training. 293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934). In
In re Summers, the Court upheld an Illinois decision denying a law professor admission to the
Illinois Bar because he had been a conscientious objector during the Second World War. 325 U.S.
561, 573 (1944).
Neither case can be accorded much persuasive value, however, since each was based on
subsequently discredited precedent. Hamilton was based on the assumption that the Free Exercise
Clause did not apply to the states. Six years later, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940),
the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause applied to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the fourteenth amendment, implicitly overniling Hamilton.
Summers was solidly based on Macintosh's holding that an oath to defend the nation implied
a promise to bear arms. Thus, after the Macintosh holding was overruled, see infra text
accompanying notes 102-05, Summers lost its precedential power as well.
102. 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
103. Girouard, 328 U.S. at 64-65. See also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 444 n.9
(1971) (Court has never squarely decided whether Constitution requires the draft to exempt
conscientious objectors).
104. Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 631 (Hughes, C. J., dissenting).
There are other and most important methods of defense, even in time of war, apart
from the personal bearing of arms. We have but to consider the defense given to our
country in the late war, both in industry and in the field, by workers of all sorts, by
engineers, nurses, doctors and chaplains, to realize that there is opportunity even at such
time for essential service in the activities of defense which do not require the overriding
of such religious scruples.
Id.
The Girouard Court agreed:
Refusal to bear arms is not necessarily a sign of disloyalty or a lack of attachment to our
institutions. One may serve his country faithfully and devotedly, though his religious
scruples make it impossible for him to shoulder a rifle. .. .IT]hose whose religious
scruples prevent them from killing are no less patriots than those whose special traits
or handicaps result in their assignment to duties far behind the fighting front.
Girouard, 328 U.S. at 64-65.
105. Girouard, 328 U.S. at 69-70.
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Whatever persuasive power the Macintosh dictum may hold, in Gillette v.
United States,1 6 the Court explicitly recognized its failure to squarely face the
question of whether the Constitution demands a conscientious objector exemption
from the draft. 7 While the Court has suggested in subsequent opinions that
the right is statutory and not constitutional in origin,"° it has deftly avoided
answering whether, absent a statutory exemption, one is required by the Free
Exercise Clause.'" Consequently, the question of whether conscientious
objection is a constitutional right implied in the Free Exercise Clause is
unsettled. The answer therefore lies in applying the Court's free exercise
analysis to the question of the conscientious objector who faces the draft.
B. Drafting Conscientious Objectors and the Free Exercise Analysis
1. Military Service as a Coercive Burden on Free Exercise
There is no question that military service is contrary to the religious belief
of many people. At least twenty-six American religious communities
affirmatively teach their members to become conscientious objectors."'
Nearly every other religious body recognizes an individual's conscientious
objection to military service as being a valid manifestation of its religious
doctrines."' In addition, many persons claiming no formal religious affiliation
106. 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Gillette involved a draftee who claimed that he should be exempted
from the draft as a conscientious objector. Gillette was conscientiously opposed to fighting in the
war against the Vietnamese, but said he would be willing to participate in certain "just" wars such
as United Nations peacekeeping operations. Id. at 439. Since the draft law granted a conscientious
objector exemption only to those whose beliefs prevented them from participating in war "in any
form," Gillette's application for an exemption was rejected. Id. at 440.
The Court explicitly did not reach the question of whether the Constitution required the
exemption of conscientious objectors from military service. Id. at 461 n.23. Instead, the Court
confined its decision to considering whether restricting the exemption to conscientious opponents to
all wars violated either the Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 448-62.
Gillette is important in that it may be interpreted as limiting the constitutional right to conscientious
objection, if such a right is ever explicitly recognized, to those who oppose participation in all wars.
107. Id. at 461 n.23. See also id. at 464 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
108. See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 461 n.23.
109. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) and United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965) (interpreting the phrase 'religious training and belief" and "Supreme Being"
expansively to avoid invalidating the exemption as being violative of the Establishment Clause).
110. For a list of these bodies, see Brown, Kohn & Kohn, Conscientious Objection: A
Constitutional Right, 21 NEw ENO. L. REV. 545, 567 n.180 (1986). These religious organizations
represent denominations in the Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Islamic, and Jewish traditions.
111. Id. at 567 n.179.
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express their deeply felt moral opposition to participation in war and refuse to
serve in the military." 2
The beliefs compelling this refusal to participate in war derive from many
sources. For some, non-participation in war is a direct command of the
Supreme Being or other authoritative spiritual teacher. "3 For others, war is
wrong because it violates natural law and is not harmonious with the true nature
of the universe." 4 Religious teachings about the necessity of social justice
also imply values inconsistent with war. "' Still others emphasize the ultimate
practicality of peace and the impracticality of war." 6 Another important
source of religiously-based opposition to war stems from the fact that military
112. 675 conscientious objectors assigned to Civilian Public Service camps during the Second
World War indicated no church membership or preference. SPECIAL MONOGRAPH NO. 11, supra
note 10, at 320.
113. "Do not resist one who is evil. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him
the other also.... You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your
enemy,' but I say to you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you." Matthew 5:
39, 43-44 (RSV).
"The sanctity and absolute value of human life is upheld by the Qur'an which states: 'Take
not life, which God/ Hath made sacred, except/ By way of justice and law' Sura 6:151," in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN REuLGIOUS TRADITIONS 55 (A. Swidler ed. 1982).
The Quakers first expressed their peace testimony thus:
We utterly deny all outward wars and strife, and fightings with outward weapons, for
any end, or under any pretense whatsoever;... The Spirit of Christ, by which we are
guided, is not changeable, so as once to command us from a thing as evil, and again to
move unto it; and we certainly know, and testify to the world, that the spirit of Christ,
which leads us into all truth, will never move us to fight and war against any man with
outward weapons, neither for the Kingdom of Christ nor for the kingdoms of this world
... Therefore, we cannot learn war any more.
Declaration to Charles 1H, 1660, PHILADELPHIA YEARLY MEETING OF THE RELIGIOUS SOC'Y OF
FRIENDS, FAITH AND PRACTICE 34 (1972).
114. "If [Buddhism's] teaching is summarized in a single phrase, it is 'not to kill others'....
It is neither a treaty nor a law made by man. It is in itself a natural law. However, man must be
taught this. For this reason, the Lord Buddha appeared and made fusessho (non-killing) a
fundamental condition for human survival." N. FUJI, BUDDHISM FOR WORLD PEACE 25 (1980).
115. "Peace is not merely the absence of war.... Instead, it is rightly and appropriately called
'an enterprise of justice' (Is. 32:17). Peace results from the harmony built into human society by
its divine founder and actualized by men as they thirst after ever greater justice." NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR
RESPONSE 21 (1983) (citation omitted).
116. See M.L. KING, STRENGTH TO LOvE 51-55 (1963) (offering practical answers to the
question "Why should we love our enemies?"). See also Id. at 153 (expressing the view that the
Christian Church cannot remain silent in the fact of nuclear annihilation and must call for an end to
the arms race).
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service requires the believer to implicitly affirm the state's authority to take life,
thereby denying the sovereignty of God in this area."'
This religiously based opposition to war is deeply rooted in American
history.' Compulsory military service was one of the primary reasons that
religious dissenters migrated to America in the seventeenth century." 9 By
1784, the bills of rights or constitutions of Pennsylvania,"2 Delaware, 2'
New York,Iu Vermont,"2 and New Hampshire"u and the militia statutes
in a majority of states explicitly exempted religious pacifists from service in the
militia."' Between the time the Constitution was drafted and its ultimate
ratification, five of the original thirteen states indicated a desire that the federal
Constitution exempt conscientious objectors from military service.t 6 Thus,
117. "For the ancients a man was primarily a citizen of his State, first a member of a
community and only afterwards a personality. If Christianity has done anything new for political
science and jurisprudence, it has been to reverse this order." G.H.C. MACGREGOR, THE NEw
TESTAMENT BASIS OF PACIFISM 109 (1936) (citation omitted).
118. See generally P. BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES-FROM THE COLONIAL ERA
TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1968).
119. See E. VIPONT, THE STORY OF QUAKERISM, 40-41 (1954).
120. PENNSYLVANIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 8 (1776), now PA. CONST. art. III, § 16.
121. DELAWARE DECLARATIONS OF RIGHTS § 10 (1776).
122. N.Y. CONST. art. XL (1777).
123. VERMONT DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 9 (1777), now VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 9.
124. N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 13.
125. Fox, Conscientious Objection to War: The Background and a Current Appraisal, 31
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 77, 79 (1982).
126. The states were Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Maryland, and Rhode Island.
Id. at 79. See also Brown, Kohn & Kohn, supra note 110, at 553.
The first Congress considered, but rejected, an amendment proposed by James Madison which
would have prohibited the states from conscripting religious objectors into their militia. The
proposed amendment read:
"The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and
well regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person."
B. SCHWARTZ, I1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1026 (1971) (debate of the
House of Representatives considering amendments to the Constitution) (emphasis added).
This amendment was directed towards the states because the Framers did not believe that the
federal Constitution empowered the United States to draft soldiers into a national army. See
generally Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 1493 (1969) (Framers of the Constitution did not intend to grant Congress power to conscript).
But see Malbin, Conscription, the Constitution and the Framers: An Historical Analysis, 40
FoRDHAm L. REV. 805 (1972) (Framers meant the power to raise armies to be construed broadly
to include the power to conscript).
The House of Representatives passed Madison's proposed amendment despite criticism by
states' rights advocates that the amendment usurped the power of the states to regulate their own
militia. B. SCHWARTZ, supra, at 1107-08 (statement of Representative Gerry). The Senate,
however, dropped the conscientious objector provision from its version of the amendment. Id. at
1149.
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Americans have from the beginning understood that military service is
incompatible with many religious teachings and has sought to accommodate
those whose consciences will not permit them to kill.
Whatever the source, participation in war forces these believers to choose
between imprisonment and denying their faith, precisely the choice that the Free
Exercise Clause was designed to prevent. Thus, conscientious objectors may
easily establish that compelling them under threat of fine or imprisonment to
serve in the armed forces burdens their right to free exercise of religion and
requires the government to justify the burden.
2. Government's Interest in Drafting Conscientious Objectors
Although the Court has shown a remarkable tendency to defer to
Congressional decisions in military affairs,"2  this deference is not
unqualified."2 The question is how strong an interest the government should
be required to demonstrate when a military policy infringes on a constitutional
right. Under the traditional free exercise analysis, the government would be
required to prove a compelling interest to draft conscientious objectors contrary
to their religious beliefs." 2  After the Smith case, however, a compelling
interest need be shown only if the objector's claim was a "hybrid" of free
exercise plus another constitutional right, or if the statutory scheme involved
provided exemptions for reasons other than religion."3
The Senate debates were unrecorded, however, and the reason for dropping the conscientious
objector exemption from the amendment regarding the militia and the right to bear arms cannot be
known with certainty. However, because the Senate also removed all the House provisions that
made the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, including the rights to freedom of conscience,
speech, press, and trial by jury, it is likely that the Senate believed it inappropriate for the federal
constitution to require the states to exempt conscientious objectors from their militia. Id. at 1145-47.
It would therefore be incorrect to view the failure of Madison's amendment as conclusive
evidence that the Framers denied constitutional protection of the right of conscientious objection.
Rather, the amendment's failure reflected their concern with the balance of military power between
the federal government and the states and not antipathy towards or non-recognition of such a right.
127. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1981).
128. Id. at 89 (Marshall, dissenting). "[Tihe phrase 'war power' cannot be invoked as a
talismanic incantation to support any exercise of congressional power which can be brought within
its ambit. '[Elven the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential
liberties.'" Id. (citations omitted).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 36-75 (discussing traditional free exercise analysis).
130. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595
(1990). See supra text accompanying notes 76-85 discussing the case.
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Clearly the draft falls into the latter category. 3' One of the essential
functions of the Selective Service System is to select who should be pressed into
military service and who should be exempted from such service.' 32 Selective
Service has created many categories of draft exemptions and deferrals to enable
it to meet not only the nation's military needs, but civilian needs as well.'
The classification process is the means by which Selective Service identifies who
should serve in the military and who can best serve the country in another
capacity. " Among these categories of persons exempted from being drafted
are conscientious objectors. 3 5  As the Court recognized in Smith,'
whenever a regulatory scheme contains a mechanism for classifying and
exempting some persons from its operation, the refusal to exempt religious
objectors suggests an unconstitutional hostility towards religion."'" Therefore,
only a compelling government interest of the highest order would justify not
exempting conscientious objectors from the draft.
The government may assert an interest in the draft in broad, general terms
of providing for the common defense,"' raising an army, 3 9 and national
security. 1"° This broad statement of the government's interest in conscription
may be sufficiently compelling to empower Congress to draft citizens into the
armed forces. 4' However, when the government seeks to exercise a power
that directly infringes an enumerated constitutional right, the government's
interest should be framed more narrowly, in terms of its interest in drafting the
131. A strong argument could also be made that the right to not kill implicates a fundamental
right of conscience that goes beyond free exercise of religion, thus becoming a 'hybrid' case that
would also require a compelling interest even after Smith. The United Nations Commission on
Human Rights has suggested that the right not to participate in war is a fundamental human right
recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See The Role of Youth in the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights, Including the Question of Conscientious Objection to Military
Service, Commission on Human Rights (45th Sess.), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/59 (stating that "the
right of everyone to have conscientious objections to military service as a legitimate exercise of the
right of freedom of thought, conscience and religion"). The question of whether conscientious
objection as a fundamental human right existing independent of the U.S. Constitution is beyond the
scope of this note.
132. See L. BASKIR & W. STRAUSS, supra note 7, at 14-15.
133. See 32 C.F.R. § 1630 (1990) (exemptions and deferrals allowed by current regulations).
134. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 451 (c)(e) (1988). See also 50 U.S.C. app. § 454 (1988).
135. 50 U.S.C. app. § 4560) (1988).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
137. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res., v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (1990) (citing
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. at 708). See also Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1127 (10th Cir.
1984), a2fd by equally divided court per curiam sub nom., Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985).
138. U.S. CONST. preamble.
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).
140. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 (1985).
141. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). See also supra note 96 (discussing
the case's holding).
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individual conscientious objector." To draft conscientious objectors, the
government must prove that accommodating their beliefs would render the draft
"unworkable. 
""
The government might demonstrate an unworkable burden on the draft if
it could prove that the number of persons seeking to be exempted as
conscientious objectors would be so large that the military would not be able to
meet its personnel needs.'" Nothing in our history suggests that this would
happen, however. Historically, the percentage of registrants classified as
conscientious objectors has been very low, never more than 1 %, even at the
height of the American war in Vietnam." 5 The long history of successful
administration of the conscientious objector exemption demonstrates that there
are no insurmountable difficulties to exempting conscientious objectors from
military service."
142. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) ("Where fundamental claims of
religious freedom are at stake' the government interest must be determined in terms of its interest
in not exempting religious objectors from the regulation.) Id. See also Pound, A Survey of Social
Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1943) (citing need to evaluate competing interests on the same
plane of generality).
143. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
144. A limited survey conducted by the government in 1980 indicated that 42.9% of the men
surveyed would seek a conscientious objector exemption and an additional 28.2 % might request the
exemption. Kellett, supra note 20, at 174 n.52 (citing Judiciary Implications of Draft Registration-
1980: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 17 (1980)). The number of applicants
for conscientious objector status has never approached this proportion in the past, however. See
infra note 145.
145. Only .15% of all draft registrants were granted conscientious objector status during the
Second World War. SPECIAL MONOGRAPH No. 11, supra note 10, at 314. During the war against
the Vietnamese (1964-73), approximately 171,700 (less than 1%) of all draft registrants applied for
and were granted exemptions as conscientious objectors. An additional 570,000 men were estimated
to have committed a draft offense such as failure to register or report for induction. Even if all of
these resisters considered themselves conscientious objectors, only about 2.8% of the eligible
draftees were conscientious objectors who would have been exempted from the draft on
constitutional grounds. See L. BASKIR & W. STRAuss, supra note 7, at 5, 30-31, and accompanying
notes.
Significant social and community pressures also have kept the number of conscientious
objectors relatively low. See Fox, supra note 125, at 104 (citing peer and parental opinion, the
desire to prove manhood, and patriotism as influences that have prevented massive resistance to
military service by Americans). Furthermore, the requirement that conscientious objectors perform
two years of alternative service also discourages insincere claims.
146. L. TRIBE, supra note 57, at 1266.
The difficulties experienced with administering the conscientious objector exemption have been
primarily caused by eligibility requirements that have limited the availability of the exemption to a
small proportion of those who have sincere conscientious opposition to participation in war. If the
statutory exemption were broadened to eliminate the distinction between "religious" and "political,
ethical, or social" objectors, and to exempt those conscientiously opposed to fighting in some, but
not necessarily all, wars, the exemption could be administered with much greater ease, though
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Not only can the government show no compelling interest in forcing
conscientious objectors to serve in the military, it has recognized an important
interest in not drafting them. The military has clarified that conscientious
objectors make ineffective soldiers and has tried to insulate itself from their
disruptive influence. 47 No soldier would willingly go into combat with a
comrade who he knows is willing to die rather than to kill. Because
conscientious objectors do not make good soldiers, forcing them into the military
does not advance the government's interest in maintaining an effective fighting
force. Consequently, the government has no compelling interest in forcing
conscientious objectors to bear arms. Without a compelling interest requiring
that conscientious objectors be drafted, the government must accommodate their
religious beliefs and exempt them from military service.
PART III: FREE EXERCISE AND DRAFr REGISTRATION
A. Registration as a Burden on Free Exercise
The Military Selective Service Act requires every male citizen to register
with the Selective Service System at age eighteen.' I  Although some
conscientious objectors claim that draft registration conflicts with their religious
beliefs, federal courts have without exception upheld the constitutionality of
requiring conscientious objectors to register for the draft against free exercise
challenges.'" In these cases, the courts have justified the infringement on free
exercise for three basic reasons.
presumably more registrants would claim and be granted conscientious objector status. One
commentator has suggested that the classification procedure could be further simplified by merely
requiring the applicant to sign an affidavit affirming the sincerity of his belief. See Fox, supra note
125, at 103.
147. Fox, supra note 125, at 104.
148. 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1988). Failure to register may result in a prison sentence of up
to five years and a fine up to $10,000. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (1988).
Conscientious objectors who refuse to register are also denied certain federal education or job
training assistance. Conscientious objectors (including those not required to register for the draft)
must certify that they are in compliance with the draft registration law before they will be granted
certain forms of federal aid under the Solomon Amendment. 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(0 (1988).
Furthermore, non-registrants are ineligible for appointment to any position within an Executive
agency if they have not registered by age 26. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3328 (1988).
149. See Detenber v. Tumage, 701 F.2d 233, 234 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Bertram,
477 F.2d 1329, 1330 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Koehn, 457 F.2d 1332, 1334 (10th Cir.
1972); United States v. Toussie, 410 F.2d 1156, 1161 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 397
U.S. 112 (1970); United States v. Bigman, 429 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 910
(1970); Richter v. United States. 181 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1950); Michener v. United States, 184
F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1950); United States v. Henderson, 180 F.2d 711, 713 (7th Cir. 1950);
Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1949), affd by equally divided court, 340 U.S.
857 (1950); Warren v. United States, 177 F.2d 596, 599 (10th Cir. 1949).
The Supreme Court has never squarely faced nor decided the question, however.
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The first reason is that the conscientious objector exemption exists solely
by legislative grace and is not a constitutional right; therefore, Congress may
impose whatever conditions upon the exemption it wishes.Se The cases
following this rationale base their holdings on the dictum from Macintosh"'
stating that the Constitution does not require an exemption of conscientious
objectors. Although the holding in Macintosh was overruled in 1946,132 its
orphaned dictum has survived to defeat the conscientious objectors' claims in
these cases. However, the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
subsequent to Macintosh suggests that Congress could not constitutionally repeal
the conscientious objector exemption.'53 Since conscientious objection is a
constitutional right, Congress cannot place conditions upon its exercise except
to achieve a compelling interest."5
A second rationale for requiring conscientious objectors to register is that
registration is only remotely related to military service and does not truly
infringe on the conscientious objector's free exercise of religion.'55 This
reasoning echoes Justice Cardozo's concurring opinion in Hamilton v. Regents,
stating that military training at a state university was so distantly related to
military service that it did not implicate pacifist students' religious beliefs against
war." The difficulty with this line of reasoning is that it requires courts to
150. See, e.g., Michener v. United States, 184 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1950); Richter v.
United States, 181 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1950); United States v. Henderson, 180 F.2d 711, 715
(7th Cir. 1950); Warren v. United States, 177 F.2d 596, 598 (10th Cir. 1949).
151. United States v. Macintosh, 238 U.S. 605 (1931). See supra notes 98-101 discussing the
case.
152. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 36-95 (applying free exercise analysis to question of
conscientious objection to draft).
154. Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). "The
state may justify inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of
achieving some compelling state interest." Id. See also West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (state regulation of right to worship may be infringed upon only by an
"immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect.").
155. "In any event, the [draft registration] requirement does not infringe or curtail religious
freedom since registration is not religious interference." United States v. Bertram, 477 F.2d 1329,
1330 (10th Cir. 1973).
156. 203 U.S. 245 (1934) After reciting conscientious objector arrangements in prior draft laws
which required conscientious objectors to furnish a replacement or the money with which to hire
one, Justice Cardozo wrote:
For one opposed to force, the affront to conscience must be greater in furnishing men
and money wherewith to wage a pending contest than in studying military science
without the duty or the pledge of service. Never in our history has the notion been
accepted, or even, it is believed, advanced, that acts thus indirectly related to service
in the camp or field are so tied to the practice of religion as to be exempt, in law or
morals, from regulation by the state.
Id. at 267 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
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examine the objector's religious belief to determine if "mere" registration
actually conflicts with the belief, an inquiry that courts are not permitted to
make. 1
57
Whatever question there may have been regarding whether draft registration
was closely or remotely related to military service was answered by the Supreme
Court in Rostker v. Goldberg.I" The issue in Rostker was the constitutionality
of requiring only males to register for the draft.' Aware that the Court often
gives great deference to military decisions, the plaintiffs argued that the impact
of draft registration on the military was "indirect and attenuated";" '
therefore, their equal protection challenge should be analyzed with the scrutiny
required of gender-based classifications in a civilian context. '' The Court
disagreed, holding that draft registration was "the first step" of induction into
military service: 62
We find these efforts to divorce registration from the military and
national defense context, with all the deference called for in that
context, singularly unpersuasive.... Registration is not an end in itself
in the civilian world but rather the first step in the induction process
into the military one, and Congress specifically linked its consideration
of registration to induction."°
157. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449-50 (1988).
Justice Cardozo may perhaps be forgiven for doing this in Hamilton since the Court did not
forbid this sort of inquiry until United States v. Ballard 322 U.S. 78 (1944), ten years after
Hamilton (see supra note 32 for discussion of Ballard). However, the courts after Ballard which
have taken it upon themselves to deny that draft registration interferes with conscientious objectors'
beliefs cannot be so easily understood.
158. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
159. Id. at 60-61.
160. Id. at 68.
161. Id., quoting Brief for Appellees at 19 (emphasis omitted). Had the plaintiffs in Rostker
been successful in their argument, their challenge would have been subject to a heightened scrutiny
which invalidates gender-based classifications unless the classification is substantially related to
achieving an important government interest. Id. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)).
162. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68.
163. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Consequently, the Court merely inquired whether registering males bore a rational relationship
to the legitimate government interest advanced by draft registration. The Court reviewed the
legislative history of the appropriation bill funding draft registration. It found that Congress
seriously considered whether women should be required to register and concluded that registering
women was not necessary and did not appropriate funds to register them. Given Congress' careful
consideration of the issue, the Court held that there was a rational reason to register males only.
"The purpose of registration was to prepare for a draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded
from combat, Congress concluded that they would not be needed in the event of a draft, and
therefore decided not to register them." Id. at 78. By this logic, the Court concluded that requiring
males only to register was rationally related to the government's interest in draft registration and did
not deny men equal protection of the law.
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Rostker gives legitimacy to the conscientious objectors' long disparaged
claim that registration constitutes a form of military service. Since draft
registration is now recognized as "the first step" into the military world,'
registration can no longer be dismissed as only remotely associated with military
service. As "first step" into military life, draft registration indeed does
constitute a form of participation in war, and as such is a direct infringement on
the religious beliefs of conscientious objectors..
The third and most plausible rationale upholding draft registration against
free exercise challenges was that draft registration is a necessary condition to
granting the conscientious objector exemption, despite its infringement of free
exercise. " Similarly, mandatory registration is also justified by the
government's interest in identifying and scrutinizing the claims of individual
conscientious objectors in order to grant the exemption.se The cases
following this rationale adhere more closely to the Court's free exercise analysis
because they recognize the conscientious objector's right to have his beliefs
accommodated. These cases suggest that the conscientious objector has already
been accommodated by the statutory exemption from actual military service; all
the conscientious objector must do is to let the government know who he is so
he can be exempted from the draft.'67
This justification was persuasive as long as the registrant could apply for
conscientious objector status immediately upon registration. However, the
argument lost much of its force when President Carter reinstated draft
registration without classifying registrants in 1980.11 Prior to 1980,
registrants could apply for the conscientious objector exemption immediately
upon registration.' 69 After 1980, however, the Selective Service decided to
postpone classification of registrants until Congress authorized inductionsaT
on the grounds that filing a claim in advance of induction would require the
System to process claims which might not be pertinent until the time of
164. Id. at 68.
165. United States v. Toussie, 410 F.2d 1156, 1161 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
397 U.S. 112 (1970)."The government's ability to carry out this statutory scheme for conscientious
objectors clearly depends in large measure on identification of those holding such beliefs." Id.
166. Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1949), affd by an equally divided court,
340 U.S. 857 (1950).
167. Toussie, 410 F.2d at 1161.
168. Proclamation No. 4771,3 C.F.R. 82 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 453 (1988).
169. Spak & Valentine, Objectors Without Recourse: The Rights of Conscience and Military
Draft Registration, 13 SETON HALL L. REv. 667, 678-79 (1983).
170. Current regulations require conscientious objectors to wait until they receive an induction
notice to submit their application for an exemption. They have ten days from receipt of the notice
in which to submit their application. 32 C.F.R. § 1636.2. (1990).
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induction.' Selective Service regulations specifically prohibit accepting any
document concerning a registrant's claim of conscientious objection prior to the
registrant being sent an induction notice.'"'
These new regulations subtly but profoundly change the nature of draft
registration for conscientious objectors. Before 1980, registration for
conscientious objectors was the first step out of the draft; now, it is the first step
into the military system with no meaningful opportunity to withdraw. The
interference with free exercise is no longer justifiable as a necessary requirement
for accommodating the conscientious objector's religious beliefs, since there is
no accommodation until induction.
Thus, the courts that have heard free exercise challenges to draft
registration have generally not appreciated the burden registration places on the
conscience of conscientious objectors. Those courts that have recognized the
burden on free exercise upheld the registration requirement as a necessary
procedure for administering the conscientious objector exemption and thereby
avoid an even greater burden. However, the nature of the free exercise
infringement posed by registration has changed with the change in draft
regulations after 1980. Therefore, a new analysis must be made of the
government's interest in requiring conscientious objectors to register for the
draft to determine whether doing so violates the Free Exercise Clause of the
United States Constitution.
B. The Government's Interest in Draft Registration
1. Is a Compelling Interest Necessary to Require Conscientious Objectors to
Register for the Draft?
The Smith case"73 now requires an analysis of whether the government
must demonstrate a compelling interest in not exempting conscientious objectors
from draft registration or whether a mere rational basis is sufficient. On first
glance, draft registration appears to be a generally applicable government
regulation the Smith Court held enforceable against religious objectors, even
absent a compelling government interest. A closer analysis, however, reveals
that Smith does not preclude application of the traditional compelling interest test
to draft registration.
171. 46 Fed. Reg. 436 (1981) (quoted in United States v. Schmucker, 815 F.2d 413, 418 (6th
Cir. 1987)).
172. 32 C.F.R. § 1633.3 (1990).
173. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595
(1990).
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As noted above, 7 4 Smith signalled a significantly lowered government
burden when generally applicable laws are challenged as infringing on free
exercise of religion. Nevertheless, the Court recognized two circumstances in
which the traditional requirement that the government demonstrate a compelling
interest in the challenged law would be applied. 75 The circumstance most
clearly applicable to draft registration is where the free exercise infringement
also violates another constitutional right, the so-called "hybrid" case. 76
While draft registration most obviously infringes on the religious beliefs of
conscientious objectors, it also is a form of forced speech. Without an
opportunity to register his religious objection to military service, registration
requires an unqualified, indefinite statement that one is available for military
service. It is precisely this statement that many nonregistrants have refused to
make. Thus, requiring conscientious objectors to register for the draft
implicates both free speech -- the right not to be forced to speak -- and free
exercise of religion. Thus, as a "hybrid" claim, the government should be
required to demonstrate a compelling interest in abridging those constitutional
rights. '77
2. Is the Government's Interest in Draft Registration "Compelling"?
Draft registration arguably advances three possible governmental interests.
First it facilitates speedy inductions if a draft becomes necessary and thus has
a military preparedness goal. Second, draft registration enables the government
to deploy the civilian workforce in wartime. Finally, draft registration serves
the government's propaganda interest by imposing upon young men the states
claim of sovereignty and its power to compel obedience. This section of the
note examines each interest to determine if any are sufficiently compelling to
justify infringing on the free exercise of religion of conscientious objectors.
174. See supra notes 76-85 (discussing Smith I1).
175. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1601.03.
176. Smith II, 110 S. Ct. at 1601-02. The second circumstance where a compelling interest is
still required is where the law or statutory scheme contains a mechanism for exempting persons for
reasons other than religion. Id. at 1603. While drafting conscientious objectors would be analyzed
in the context of the Selective Service's extensive classification policy (see supra notes 131-137 and
accompanying text) because the current registration system does not classify or exempt registrants
from the registration requirement, it does not seem to help conscientious objectors in this context.
But see United States v. Schmucker, 815 F.2d 413, 419-20 (6th Cir. 1987) (discussing Congress'
policy of exempting women from registration by reason of their gender and Selective Service's
policy of administratively exempting severely mentally handicapped men from registration).
177. Smith II, IOS. Ct. at 1601-02.
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a. The Interest in Facilitating a Draft
While national defense is indeed a compelling government function, it does
not follow that every government policy regarding national defense is equally
compelling."T For example, preparing for a draft in peacetime by requiring
registration may be important, but not as compelling as actual conscription in
wartime would be. Therefore, the general interest in national defense may be
important enough to justify requiring young men in general to register, but it is
not necessarily important enough to justify infringing on the religious liberty of
conscientious objectors. Both the relatively small number of potential
conscientious non-registrants'" and the ease of collecting the information by
other means"* suggests that the government's interest in requiring
conscientious objectors to register could not be characterized as compelling.
Until Congress decides that the national defense requires conscription,
registration cannot be fairly said to be sufficiently compelling to justify denial
of religious liberty to conscientious objectors.
If conscription is resumed, however, it is unclear whether the government
even then would have a compelling interest in requiring conscientious objectors
to register. Rostker held that the government's primary interest in draft
registration is to facilitate a draft of combat troops and therefore justified
discriminating between men -- who are eligible for combat -- and women, who
are not.' Rostker did not address whether the government had an interest in
requiring conscientious objectors to register for the draft, but the case implies
that since conscientious objectors cannot be drafted into combatant roles,
requiring them to register is no more necessary to meet military needs than
registering women would be.
b. The Interest in Deploying the Civilian Workforce
At a broader level, the government may claim that draft registration serves
other important interests besides aiding the drafting of combat troops. One of
these might be to facilitate deployment of the civilian workforce during a
national emergency. Indeed, the Military Selective Service Act"s lists several
reasons for the draft other than maintaining adequate armed forces. Among
178. See Reilly, supra note 11, at 110 (weight of government's interest should be limited to the
precise obligation which burdens free exercise of religion).
179. See supra note 145 (discussing the number of conscientious objectors in past wars).
180. See infra note 192 (discussing Selective Service's effectiveness at getting information about
non-registrants from other sources).
181. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78 (1981). See also supra notes 158-164 (discussing
Rostcer).
182. Act of June 24, 1948, 62 Stat. 604, codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451 et seq (1988).
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these are the equitable sharing of the obligation to defend the nation; n the
maintenance of an effective national economy;U securing maximum scientific
research; and development and full utilization of the nations' manpower
resources.'" To achieve these goals, the government may reasonably assert
that it needs a universal register of the nation's workforce.
While plausible on its face, this assertion does not constitute a compelling
interest that justifies requiring conscientious objectors to register for the draft.
First, by excluding women from the registration requirement, the government
suggests that only the talents and abilities of males are required for national
defense."s If draft registration was truly intended to maintain an up-to-date
inventory of the national workforce, the need would require universal
registration of all citizens, women as well as men."
Second, if the government has a compelling need for a national personnel
inventory, this goal could be achieved by means other than personal registration
for the draft. In the past, draft regulations allowed local draft board clerks to
register individuals for whom the board has the necessary information without
requiring the person to personally sign the registration card.ss In addition,
the government could compile its national personnel inventory with information
from other sources, such as social security or tax records, that provide the same
data required by draft registration." Clearly the need for a national personnel
183. 50 U.S.C. app. § 451(c) (1988).
184. Id.
185. 50 U.S.C. app. § 451(e) (1988).
186. Id.
187. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 452 U.S. 57, 95-96 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing between the differing goals of registration and actual induction into military service,
the goal of registration being to provide an inventory of available strength within the military
qualified pool in the country).
188. This asserted interest also implies that all citizens, not only young ones, should be
registered in anticipation of a national emergency.
189. 32 C.F.R. § 1613.13(c) (1990).
If the registrant is unable or refises to sign the registration card ... the registrar shall
sign such registrant's name ... and the act of the registrar in doing so shall have the
same force and effect as if the registrant had signed the Registration Card ... and such
registrant shall thereby be registered.
Id. (emphasis added) (cited in United States v. Koehn, 475 F.2d 1332, 1333 n.1 (1972).
The court did not interpret this regulation to require Selective Service to register an
uncooperative conscientious objector, however, nor did it preclude his conviction for failure to
register. United States v. Koehn, 457 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1972).
190. Selective Service has gained access to several large data bases, enabling it to cross-check
its records to identify non-registrants. 84% of the records in its Registration Compliance Program
come from state driver's license records. Selective Service also receives lists of high school seniors
and registered voters from communities where it suspects there to be a large number of non-
registrants. Finally, Selective Service is provided information by the Federal Aviation Agency,
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inventory could be met without requiring conscientious objectors to personally
register for the draft.
c. The Interest in Reminding Citizens of the State's Sovereignty
Finally, the government may claim that draft registration advances its
interest in reminding young citizens of their patriotic obligation to defend the
state and the state's power to compel their cooperation. The government's
interest in educating the young to its claim of supremacy best explains why the
government has been so insistent in exercising its power to compel registration
of conscientious objectors.' 9' Registration of conscientious objectors is not
necessary to accomplish the primary goal of drafting combat troops since they
cannot serve in combat. Similarly, personal registration is not essential to
achieve the data-collection function of draft registration since the government
already has access to the information it asks the registrant to supply. 92
However, the government's interest in asserting its sovereignty would be
frustrated without the requirement of personal draft registration. In this sense,
registration more resembles a symbolic act of allegiance by which the registrant
indicates his submission to the authority of the state than an administrative
necessity.'9
While the Constitution does not forbid the government from using draft
registration as a vehicle to teach patriotic values, the first amendment does
protect those who conscientiously oppose the ritual from being forced to
Social Security Administration, and the Departments of Defense, Transportation, Veterans Affairs
and Education and matches the records against its own list of draft registrants. Once identified,
Selective Service sends letters to the non-registrants reminding them of their obligation to register.
If there is no response, the names are turned over to the Justice Department for criminal
investigation. SEMIANNUAL REPORT 1986, supra note 18, at 5.
191. In the early 1980s, the United States targeted non-registrants who informed the government
of their conscientious objection to registration for prosecution, eventually indicting sixteen of them.
Although at least one United States Attorney sought permission to decline prosecution of a
conscientious objector, permission was denied. Instead, Justice Department authorities advised local
United States Attorneys to handle conscientious objector non-registrants on a priority basis. The
government's decision to prosecute only conscientious objectors who informed the government of
their decision, and not other classes of non-registrants indicates that conscientious objectors
presented a particular threat to the government's authority. See Reilly, supra note 11, at 85-88.
The policy of prosecuting only vocal non-registrants reflects the government's willingness to
"tolerate[] evasive non-compliance, but not forthright dissent." Id. at 112-13.
192. See supra note 190.
193. The government itself referred to registration as a mere "syrfibolic" act on the part of the
conscientious objector non-registrant. Reilly, supra note 11, at 113 n.202. "What the government
wanted was to force [conscientious objector non-registrants] to succumb, to bow down to the
superior power of civil authority, to abandon conscience for obeisance.' Id. at 113. See also
Kellett, supra note 20, at 172, 178.
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participate.'" The Constitution's protection of religious liberty is precisely
designed to prevent the state from extracting symbolic statements of loyalty or
patriotism.'" Whatever the wisdom of maintaining draft registration as a
unifying, patriotic rite of passage for young men, the first amendment protects
conscientious objectors from being punished for refusing to participate.'9"
No compelling government interest in registration justifies requiring
conscientious objectors to register for the draft. The government's primary
interest in drafting combat troops is not advanced by requiring conscientious
objectors to register since they cannot serve in combat."9  Its interest in
maintaining a national personnel inventory from which to draft troops can be
achieved through means that do not require an the conscientious objector to act
contrary to his conscience." Finally, the government's interest in draft
registration as a means of indoctrinating young people with its claim to
sovereignty is an impermissible infringement upon the religious liberty of one
who denies the state sovereignty over his conscience. 96 Consequently, no
compelling government interest exists in requiring conscientious objectors to
register for the draft that could not be achieved by means that did not infringe
on free exercise. The Constitution therefore prohibits punishing conscientious
objectors who refuse to register for the draft.
C. Free Exercise Challenges to Registration Since 1980
Despite the foregoing, no federal court has upheld a free exercise challenge
to draft registration. Only one reported appellate case since 1980 has analyzed
whether the Free Exercise Clause exempts conscientious objectors from the
registration requirement. In United States v. Schmucker,=' a Mennonite
college student informed Selective Service of his refusal to register for the draft
on religious grounds.20' After refusing subsequent opportunities to register,
Schmucker was indicted, convicted, and sentenced for violating the Military
194. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that Jehovah's
Witnesses could not be expelled from school for refusing to participate in a daily flag salute
ceremony).
195. "We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control." Id. at 642.
196. Id. at 640.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 178-81.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 182-90.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 191-96.
200. 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 471 U.S. 1001,
rev'd, 815 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1987). For a detailed analysis of this case by one of Schmucker's
lawyers, see generally Reilly, supra note 11.
201. 721 F.2d at 1048.
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Selective Service Act. 2  Schmucker defended on equal protection and free
exercise grounds. 3
202. Id.
203. Schmucker alleged that the government's "passive enforcement" policy violated his right
to equal protection of the law. The passive enforcement system relied upon self-reporting of
conscientious non-registrants or upon reports from third parties that a person had not registered.
Once identified, these persons were given a series of government demands to register, beginning
with a form letter from Selective Service and ending with an indictment for non-registration. Reilly,
supra note 11, at 87-88. This policy had the effect of punishing vocal non-registrants for exercising
their first amendment rights because those who did not publicize their non-compliance were not
sought out for prosecution. Schmucker, 712 F.2d at 1049.
Schmucker had requested a hearing by the trial court to present evidence that the passive
enforcement policy singled out vocal opponents to draft registration for prosecution. The district
court denied the request on the grounds that even if the passive enforcement policy was proven, it
would not be a valid defense. Id. at 1048.
On his first appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed holding that if
Schmucker could prove that the government initiated his prosecution because he exercised his first
amendment right to free exercise of religion, such a prosecution would violate the Constitution. "It
[the selective prosecution policy] selects for prosecution only those who speak out against the [draft]
law. It selects people based on their expression of beliefs and the strength of their convictions....
It discourages dissenters from expressing their criticisms of government policy." Id. at 1049.
Although the appellate court acknowledged that Schmucker's opposition to registration was
religiously based, most of its analysis dealt with whether the selective prosecution policy infringed
on his rights of free speech and expression and did not carefully examine the free exercise claim.
See id. at 1048, 1049-52.
The government appealed to the United States Supreme Court which granted certiorari. United
States v. Schmucker, 471 U.S. 1001 (1985). Before oral arguments, however, the Court vacated
the Sixth Circuit's reversal of the conviction and remanded to the district court with instructions to
reconsider in light of Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
Like Schmucker, Wayte involved a challenge of the passive enforcement policy on equal
protection and first amendment grounds. The Supreme Court held that Wayte had not proven that
the selective prosecution policy had the effect of discriminating between him and others "similarly
situated" and, even if he had proven a discriminatory effect, that he had not shown that the
government's policy was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.
at 609-10 (1985).
Instead of considering whether Wayte had been treated differently than non-registrants in
general, the Court analyzed whether he had been treated differently than other vocal non-registrants.
Since other vocal non-registrants were also facing prosecution, the Court concluded that Wayte was
being treated the same as others similarly situated and that his equal protection claim was therefore
without merit. Id.
The Court also upheld the passive enforcement policy against a direct First Amendment
challenge. Wayte claimed that prosecuting him because he informed the government of his refusal
to register effectively punished him because he exercised his free speech rights. Utilizing the
analysis used for regulations that incidently impact speech first articulated in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court held that draft registration was within the government's
power and advanced substantial government interests unrelated to regulating speech. First, the
policy helped the government identify and prosecute non-registrants without delay. Second, the
letters vocal non-registrants sent to the government provided evidence of their intent to not register,
an essential element of the crime. Finally, the Court said that failing to prosecute vocal non-
registrants would encourage others to violate the law. The Court ruled that since the passive
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In considering his free exercise claim, the court weighed three factors: the
magnitude of the burden on Schmucker's free exercise of religion; the
importance of the state's interest justifying the burden; and the extent to which
accommodation of Schmucker's beliefs would impede the government's
interests.204 The court concluded that the impact of registration on Schmucker
was minimal and that the government's interest in requiring Schmucker to
register was compelling. The government's interest therefore outweighed
Schmucker's right to free exercise of religion,' 5 and no accommodation was
required."
In reaching this conclusion, the court misapplied the Supreme Court's free
exercise analysis in several ways. First, the court decided that draft registration
placed only a "minimal" burden on Schmucker's free exercise of religion.'
To reach this conclusion, the court attempted to measure the extent to which
draft registration interfered with Schmucker's beliefs, despite the legal
inappropriateness and the metaphysical impossibility of doing so.' The
enforcement policy was a temporary policy until the government was able to identify more non-
registrants by matching draft registration rolls with state driver's license lists and Social Security
files, the policy was the least restrictive method of meeting those interests. Therefore, the passive
prosecution policy did not violate the first amendment. 470 U.S. at 610-14.
On remand, the district court reconsidered Schmucker's equal protection challenge based on
the selective prosecution of vocal non-registrants. Schmucker, 815 F.2d 413, 418-19. The district
court again denied Schmucker's motion for an evidentiary hearing to prove that he was selected for
prosecution because of his free exercise of religion.
Schmucker appealed again to the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 417. The court relied on the Supreme
Court's holding in Wayte that vocal non-registrants were not being prosecuted because they exercised
their first amendment rights, but because they provided the government with evidence essential to
convict them. The Court said that another reason for prosecuting vocal non-registrants was that the
passive registration policy was only temporary until other methods of identifying non-registrants
were available. Wayte, 470 U.S. 598, 612-14 (1985). Therefore, prosecuting vocal non-registrants
did not punish them for exercising free speech. Id. at 609-10; Schmucker, 815 F.2d at 419.
Schmucker's lawyers attempted to distinguish Wayte as being a free speech case where
Schmucker involved free exercise. Reilly, supra note 11, at 103. The distinction was important
since registration did not affect Wayte's free speech in the same way that it affected Schmucker's
free exercise of religion. Wayte could still protest draft registration without penalty even after he
registered. Schmucker's free exercise and the government's registration requirement could not
coexist however; if he registered, he violated his religious tenets. Id. at 104. Nevertheless, the
Schmucker court followed Wayte and rejected his equal protection claim based on the selective
prosecution policy. Schmucker, 815 F.2d at 418-19.
204. United States v. Schmucker, 815 F.2d 413, 417 (6th Cir. 1987).
205. Id. at 417-18.
206. Id. at 417.
207. Id.
208. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 449-50 (1988)
(Court may not weigh the "adverse effects" of a regulation on one set of religious objectors and
compare to the effect on others). See also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding
that courts may not inquire into the truth of a religious belief, only whether the belief is sincerely
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damage done by forcing a person to do something he thinks is wrong is not
quantifiable and cannot be "measured" in any sensible way. Mark Schmucker's
statement of the depth of his opposition to the act,' corroborated by his
behavior consistent with that statement," ° should have been considered as
conclusive proof that draft registration was a significant burden on his free
exercise of religion.2 ' By holding that registration only "minimally"
interfered with Schmucker's free exercise, the court substituted its perception of
his religious beliefs, despite his uncontradicted testimony to the.contrary.
212
The court also exaggerated the importance of the government's interest in
requiring Schmucker to register for the draft. The court uncritically accepted
the government's interest in draft registration as part and parcel of its national
defense program and concluded that this interest outweighed the infringement on
Schmucker's free exercise rights.2"3 Moreover, the court did not require the
government to show that requiring Schmucker to register was the least restrictive
means of achieving its interest in draft registration. In his brief, Schmucker
suggested several ways in which the government could have met its defense
needs without requiring him to personally register.2"4 The court ignored these
alternatives and simply stated that Congress was entitled to broad deference in
military matters and upheld the registration requirement. 2"5
The Schmucker decision demonstrates how institutional pressures to defer
to military authorities and Congress can overcome legal precedent and
held).
209. See supra note 11 (text of Schmucker's letter to Selective Service).
210. Schmuckerwas ordered to serve two years at a home for severely and profoundly mentally
retarded adults, during which time he was confined to the premises and was not permitted to visit
the library or even to accompany residents and staff on field outings. Schmucker refused to
authorize his attorneys to request a suspension of his sentencing pending appeal. He served
approximately thirteen months when the district court suspended his sentence following the Sixth
Circuit's reversal of his conviction. Reilly, supra note 11, at 92 n.61.
211. Even the district court judge recognized the sincerity of Schmucker'sbelief that registering
for the draft was immoral. She specifically stated that he was not required to register for the draft
as a condition of his probation. Reilly, supra note 11, at 92.
212. Id.
213. Schmucker, 815 F.2d at 417-18.
214. Reilly, supra note 11, at 114.
215. Schmucker, 815 F.2d at 718.
The court specifically rejected Schmucker's claim that the Free Exercise Clause required the
government to evaluate his claim as a conscientious objector prior to or immediately after
registering. The court noted that since a conscientious objector's objection to participating in war
was already accommodated by the statutory exemption from actual military service, the government
was under no obligation to further accommodate the objector by immediately classifying him.
Furthermore, since Congress had not appropriated funds to classify registrants, the court held that
the legislative decision to defer classification should be given great deference since it dealt with
military and national security matters. Id.
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reasoning. 21 6  Despite ample evidence and legal analysis supporting
Schmucker's claims, the court failed to require proof that prosecuting Mark
Schmucker was the least restrictive way the government could meet its national
defense interests. This failure suggests that the courts may not be reliable
guardians of individual liberty when infringed upon by military authorities. If
the Schmucker court had not impermissibly measured the extent to which
registration infringed on Mark Schmucker's beliefs;217 if it had weighed the
government's interest in requiring Schmucker to register rather than the
government's interest in national defense in general;2"8 and if it had required
the government to meet its interest in a way that did not interfere with
Schmucker's free exercise," 9 his conviction could not have been affirmed.
The case demonstrates that the courts are unwilling to protect the religious
liberty of conscientious objectors when asserted against military authorities, and
the necessity of legislative or administrative reform.
PART IV: PROPOSALS TO ACCOMMODATE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS OF
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS TO DRAFT REGISTRATION
Although the courts have sufficient legal precedent and theory to protect the
right of conscientious objectors to be exempted from draft registration, the
Schmucker decision demonstrates the reluctancy of the courts to exercise that
power. The courts have repeatedly refused to subject military-imposed
infringements of first amendment liberties to the strict scrutiny used in other
cases of government interference with constitutional 'rights.' This failure to
closely examine military-related regulations suggests that the courts are not
reliable sources to protect individual liberty from military infringement.
Therefore, either Selective Service policies or Congressional legislation are
necessary to better protect the rights of conscientious objectors.
Any reform aimed at protecting the rights of conscientious objectors should
satisfy three criteria. First, since Congress believes that draft registration is
necessary, a current data base of potential draftees must be maintained in the
event that an emergency requires immediate conscription. Second, any reform
should protect as many conscientious objectors as possible without jeopardizing
the government's need for a sufficient pool of potential draftees. Finally, the
reform should be simple and inexpensive to administer. The following proposals
216. Reilly, supra note 11, at 80-82.
217. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 55, 64-65 (1981).
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suggest various reforms that aim at protecting the conscientious objector's rights
without jeopardizing national security.
A. Legislative Proposals
1. Abolish Registration
The most obvious method of protecting conscientious objector's religious
objections to war would be to abolish registration and the draft altogether. "
This method could probably be accomplished without jeopardizing national
security. Draft registration was reintroduced in 1980 as much as a political
statement as a necessary measure for national defense.' The national
commitment to and experience with the all-volunteer force has demonstrated that
in peacetime, at least, no draft is necessary to meet the nation's defense
needs.' The military has estimated that peacetime draft registration speeds
up the induction process only by six to seven weeks. 2  Past experience
suggests that volunteers could be counted on to meet any military emergency
during that time without having conscription in place beforehand.'
Therefore, abolishing draft registration would solve the conscientious objector's
dilemma, save money, and not inflict any significant harm on the nation's
defense posture.
However, even if registration were abolished, conscientious objectors would
not necessarily be protected from a registration requirement in a future draft.
The history of the modern draft suggests that future drafts will include a
registration procedure requiring individuals to personally provide information to
Selective Service. Abolition of registration would therefore only postpone, not
resolve, the conscientious objector's dilemma.
2. Immediate Declaration or Classification upon Registration Form
221. See Kellett, supra note 20, at 179-80.
222. "We are deeply concerned about the unwarranted and vicious invasion of Afghanistan by
the Soviet Union.... We have taken a series of steps-economic, diplomatic, political, military steps-
-in order to convince the Soviet Union that their action is ill advised." Remarks on Signing
Proclamation 4771, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 1274 (July 2, 1980).
223. President Carter said "I am not in favor of a peacetime draft.... The only time that I
envision a mandatory draft law being advocated to the Congress would be in time of war or in time
of national emergency." Id.
224. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5965 [H.R. 6030], Department of Defense
Authorizaion for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983 and 1984 Before the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 831, 851 (1982).
225. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, for example, 200,000 men volunteered for the military
within two months, far more than could be trained in that time. More recently, the military reported
a surge of voluntary enlistments following the U.S. invasion of Grenada and the attack on U.S.
Marines in Lebanon. Kellett, supra note 20, at 179 nn.84, 85.
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Several contemporary commentators propose that conscientious objectors
be permitted to indicate their intention to apply for a conscientious objector
exemption by on the registration form.' This simple reform has the
advantage of providing the conscientious objector with an opportunity to declare
his intention while simultaneously meeting his obligation under the draft
registration law. Many non-registering conscientious objectors would register
if this option were available. The cost of this reform would be negligible
since the only cost would be to redesign the registration form.
While superficially attractive, this proposal has several disadvantages.
First, the reform does not accommodate the religious beliefs of conscientious
objectors who would not register for the draft even with the opportunity to be
exempted.' The proposal would still require conscientious objectors to act
affirmatively in cooperation with military authorities. This objection is not
necessarily a fatal flaw, however. The Constitution does not require complete
accommodation of every individual's religious belief; even the Sherbert
compelling interest standard allows infringement on free exercise if the
government can show that doing so would render the statutory scheme
"unworkable. "' Thus, if Congress adopted the checkoff method of declaring
one's conscientious objection to war, the government would have a strong
argument of reasonable accommodation with religious belief withoutjeopardizing
its legitimate interest.
Second, a mere declaration of intent to apply for an exemption on the draft
registration form has little or no legal effect.' At the most, it might
constitute evidence of the registrant's sincerity if and when he receives an
induction notice and applies for conscientious objector status. Until formal
226. One proposal suggests that the draft registration form contain the statement:
By means of my completion of this draft registration form, I am complying with my
legal obligation to register for possible military service. By placing my initials in the
box provided for at left, however, I state that if military conscription is commenced at
such time at which I am eligible for it, I intend to apply for conscientious objector status
because I object, by virtue of my religious training and belief, to all forms of war. I
understand, though, that if I choose not to place my initials in the box at left I will not
be waiving such right to apply for conscientious objector status.
Spak & Valentine, supra note 169, at 679-80; See also Kellett, supra note 20, at 180.
227. The first non-registrant conscientious objector to be convicted under the present system,
Enten Eller, stated that he would have registered if the registration form would have allowed him
to tentatively register his conscientious objection. Kellett, supra note 20, at 171 n.23.
228. Mark Schmucker, for example, testified at his trial that he would not register for the draft
even if offered the opportunity to indicate his intention to apply for conscientious objector status.
Testimony of Mark Schmucker, quoted in Reilly, supra note 11, at 90.
229. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
230. The statement might be as evidence of the sincerity of the belief in a later hearing or
classification procedure, however.
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classification, which does not occur until the registrant receives an induction
notice, the registrant is presumably considered available for military duty. A
check-off therefore would do nothing to achieve the legal separation from the
military authorities many conscientious objectors seek.
This drawback could be neutralized if Selective Service formally classified
anyone who indicated on the registration form that he was a conscientious
objector. Doing so would officially recognize the registrant's conscientious
objection and legally exempt the objector from later military service. However,
unless Selective Service is willing to accept a simple declaration on the
registration form as sufficient evidence of the sincerity and religious nature of
his objection, the registrant would still have to be examined at some point to
determine the validity of his claim."
It is also possible that if the conscientious objector exemption were made
this easy to receive, many more persons would apply. Even though the number
of persons applying for conscientious objector status has historically been
minute, 2 if the exemption were granted based on an unexamined statement
by the registrant, the possibility of fraudulent claims would increase.
Consequently, public support for the draft and for exempting conscientious
objectors might be decreased. 3 This concern suggests that the conscientious
objector application should be verified before the exemption were legally
granted. However, verification would require additional administrative
organization and costs, negating the proposals' chief advantage.
3. Separate Register of Conscientious Objectors
A more comprehensive legislative reform would be to establish an
alternative register of conscientious objectors, separate from the Selective
Service register, similar to the system England used before it abolished
conscription.' This proposal would require all young men and/or women at
231. Selective Service currently requires local draft boards to examine and evaluate
classification requests of conscientious objectors before granting the exemption. 32 C.F.R. § 1605
(1990).
232. See supra note 145 (citing numbers of conscientious objectors in recent history).
233. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 460 (1971) (suggesting that if the public
perceives that those drafted are chosen unfairly or capriciously, bitterness and cynicism might
corrode the spirit of public service).
234. See National Service Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 c.64, § 17-19. These sections of the act
allowed persons who held conscientious objections to (a) combatant military service, (b) any active
military service, or (c) registering for military service to register on an alternative register of
conscientious objectors. After being provisionally registered on the register of conscientious
objectors, the individual was required to appear before a local tribunal to offer evidence of the
sincerity of this belief. If sincere, the tribunal would register the conscientious objector as being
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a designated age to register either upon the Selective Service System's register
or on a separately administered Register of Conscientious Objectors (ROCO).
ROCO would be entirely separate from Selective Service and would be
administered by a civilian agency unconnected to the military. 2 5  Until a
national emergency caused Congress to initiate inductions into the military, the
registrants on both rolls would simply be required to report changes in their
address.
Only when inductions were begun would registrants on both rolls be
classified. Conscientious objectors would be examined and classified, according
to the nature of their objection, as either being available for non-combatant
military service or for alternative civilian service, or unavailable for any
compulsory service whatsoever. 6  If a registrant on ROCO was found to be
insincere in his opposition to war, he would be administratively registered with
Selective Service and liable to the military draft. Conscientious objectors would
be called up for civilian service by procedures similar to and for the same
duration as registrants with Selective Service were called. 7
This scheme's greatest advantage is that it grants legal status and
institutional recognition to conscientious objectors. It recognizes that the
decision to make oneself available for military service has a profoundly moral
dimension and should not be made by default. It would lessen the coercion
placed on young men who are uncertain of their position regarding war by
giving them a reputable alternative to registering for the military draft. The
unconditionally exempt from military service, available for civilian alternative service, or available
for non-combatant service under military command, depending on the nature of the applicant's
opposition.
Furthermore, the Minister of Labour and National Service had authority to add the name of
any person he reasonably believed to be a conscientious objector to the register, effectively
protecting even those who were unwilling to personally register on the alternative roll.
235. Although Selective Service is technically a civilian agency, it is so closely related to the
military that cooperation with it is deemed by many conscientious objectors cooperation with the
military.
In England, the register was administered by the Minister for Labour and National Service.
National Service Act, supra note 234. In the United States, the Department of Labor would
similarly be a logical place to situate a ROCO.
236. Currently, American law only recognizes two categories of conscientious objectors. Those
classified I-A-O are conscientious objectors who refuse to bear arms but are willing to serve in the
military in a non-combatant role. 32 C.F.R. § 1630.11 (1990) Those classified 1-0 are unwilling
to serve in any capacity in the military. 32 C.F.R. § 1630.16 (1990). These registrants are still
required to perform a term of civilian-administered public service equal to the length of time draftees
are required to serve, currently two years. 32 C.F.R. § 1656.19 (1990). England's scheme, on the
other hand, permits those with more absolutist beliefs to refuse to perform even compulsory civilian
service.
237. For Selective Service Regulations regarding random selection procedures for induction,
see 32 C.F.R. § 1624 (1990).
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proposal would encourage young people to seriously consider their position
regarding war and the taking of life, rather than presuming that every citizen is
willing to kill at the government's request.
The scheme has at least two serious drawbacks, however. First, the
availability of the alternative roll may encourage more persons to register as
conscientious objectors. Although there is no evidence in our history to suggest
that enough young men would so register to significantly harm the military's
manpower needs,' the uncertainty of whether enough men would enroll with
Selective Service to make an effective draft possible would have to be resolved
before ROCO would be established. This is a particular problem since there is
little concrete data on the relative number of "closet" conscientious objectors
who have managed to avoid the draft by other means but who would qualify as
conscientious objectors and would register on the ROCO. 2 9
This problem may be less daunting than it seems, however. First, because
registrants on ROCO would be drafted to perform two years of civilian
alternative service just as draftees serve two years in the military, signing up on
ROCO would not give any particular advantage to someone not acting
conscientiously. Conscientious objectors would still be required to interrupt
their education and career plans to provide alternative service similar to military
draftees. Furthermore, the government could provide incentives to enrolling on
the military register to discourage insincere registrants on ROCO.' Finally,
the eventual examination and classification of conscientious objectors would
identify unqualified registrants and make them available for military service.
Knowing this, there would be no advantage to registering as a conscientious
objector unless one was sincerely opposed to participation in war."
238. See supra note 145 (discussing number of conscientious objectors in recent history).
239. See generally L. BASKIR & W. STRAUSS, supra note 7 (detailing the many ways in which
young men avoided military service during the war against the Vietnamese). However, assuming
most of these persons were legitimately exempted from the draft, their being exempt as conscientious
objectors would not affect the number of men available for military service.
240. These could include veterans education and medical benefits. The Supreme Court has
upheld denying these benefits to conscientious objectors who performed alternative service as
permissible inducements to young people to become eligible for the draft. Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361 (1974).
241. The question of whether conscientious opponents to particular wars should be eligible to
for register on ROCO is a complex one beyond the scope of this note. However, if ROCO was
made available to those who sincerely oppose participating in some, but not all, wars, then the
number of conscientious objectors would probably increase significantly. This is because of the
teachings of the majority of American Christian and Jewish denominations that allow participation
in "just" wars but forbid fighting in unjust wars. See generally J. ROHR, supra note 6; A CONFUCT
OF LOYAL-TIES: THE CASE FOR SELECTIvE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, (J. Finn ed. 1968).
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A second obvious disadvantage to setting up an alternative register would
be its expense and administrative complexity. While a register of conscientious
objectors may not have to parallel to Selective Service's register in every detail,
the mere fact that fewer conscientious objectors would be registered may not
significantly reduce the cost of the alternative roll which would have to duplicate
many of Selective Service's functions. u2 Not only would Congress be
unlikely to approve the funds to establish a register of conscientious objectors,
public sentiment may not support establishing another government agency,
especially in peacetime when registration and the draft are not the volatile
political issues they are in time of war. Such a proposal is even less likely to
be approved during wartime, however, and should be considered in the
relatively more rational atmosphere of peacetime.
B. Administrative Reform
In the absence of more comprehensive legislative reforms, Selective Service
could adopt administrative policies that would protect conscientious objectors
while maintaining a list of draft age men available to be called in an emergency.
One feasible method is for Selective Service to adopt a policy of administrative
registration. 3 This policy would authorize Selective Service personnel to add
the names of conscientious objector non-registrants to its files without requiring
the registrant to personally provide the information.' The apparatus required
to administratively register non-registrants is already in place. For several
years, Selective Service has had authorization from the states to match driver's
license records with Social Security files and uses this method to identify non-
registrants.' This matching process provides Selective Service with the
information it needs from the registrant and could be used to add data about the
registrant to its files without requiring him to act contrary to conscience.
Administrative registration would meet the government's interest in compiling
an inventory of all draft-age men from which to base future induction needs
without requiring a religiously offensive, affirmative act on the part of the
conscientious objector.
Administrative registration would delay conscientious objectors from having
to affirmatively cooperate with Selective Service until inductions resumed. As
242. President Bush requested $26 million to fund the Selective Service System for fiscal year
1990. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FY
1990, 5-16.
243. See supra note 189 (discussing similar provision in previous draft regulations).
244. Current regulations require the registrant to personally supply his name, permanent and
current addresses, telephone number, sex, date of birth, telephone number, Social Security Number,
signature and date signed. 32 C.F.R. § 1615.4(a) (1990).
245. See supra note 190 (detailing Selective Service's extensive data collection program to
identify non-registrants).
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long as the conscription apparatus is on standby, conscientious objectors would
not have to take any action and would be purged from the registration list when
they reached their twenty-sixth birthday. If conscription were resumed, the
conscientious objector could be required to provide necessary information to be
classified in order to qualify for the exemption. If at that point the conscientious
objector failed to personally provide information needed to classify him,
Selective Service could investigate and classify the person as a conscientious
objector if it were convinced that the non-registrant was sincere in his objection
to cooperating with the military and would qualify for the conscientious objector
exemption if registered. If not, the conscientious objector should be allowed to
raise his religious objection as a defense at his trial.
Because Selective Service could adopt administrative registration as its
policy without Congressional action, it is the most feasible immediate solution
to the conscientious objector's dilemma.' There is no longer any compelling
need to require the conscientious objector to take the affirmative act of going to
the post office to give the government information it already has. The cost of
administrative registration would be minimal, since Selective Service is already
checking its registration records with other government files to discover non-
registrants. In fact, it may prove to be less costly to register conscientious
objectors than to prosecute them.
Administrative registration does not require Selective Service to abandon
draft registration altogether. The Constitution does not forbid the government
from requiring citizens to provide it with information; the Constitution requires
only that the government have a compelling reason to force religious objectors
to provide information. Non-registrants who fail to register for reasons other
than conscientious objection may therefore still be prosecuted if they fail to
register. Only conscientious objectors have the constitutional right to be
administratively registered in this manner.
Each of these proposals would offer more protection of the conscientious
objector's free exercise than is now available. The choice of which one to adopt
will reflect how the nation views conscientious objectors. If conscientious
objection is viewed as an admirable moral position to which all should aspire,
the ROCO proposal would best reflect the high value given to conscience and
246. The Supreme Court is likely to uphold administrative registration against a constitutional
challenge. The Court has held that administratively assigning a Social Security number to a child
in order for her to receive welfare benefits does not interfere with her parents' free exercise rights.
See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700 (1986).
The case for administrative registration is more compelling where, as in draft registration,
failure to accommodate the religious objector may result in imprisonment than where the failure to
accommodate free exercise results in loss of welfare benefits.
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peacemaking. If, however, conscientious objection is viewed with suspicion as
inherently cowardly, self-serving, or subversive, it should be discouraged. The
current policy of ignoring conscientious objectors' free exercise reflects this
second view.
Classification at registration and administrative registration are more neutral
positions. They neither encourage nor discourage conscientious objection. They
do recognize its existence, however, as a valid expression of religious belief.
Of these two neutral reforms, administrative registration is the more
advantageous. Administrative registration would protect more conscientious
objectors and would not require an extensive classification system just for
conscientious objectors. The information required for administrative registration
is already in Selective Service's hands and would not create any additional costs
to the agency. Administrative registration, because of its feasibility, is the best
policy to adopt at the present time.
CONCLUSION
Despite the long history of conscientious objection in America, the Supreme
Court has never definitively decided whether a conscientious objection
exemption from military service is guaranteed by the Constitution. Nevertheless,
the Court's free exercise decisions, at least until recently, suggests that
conscientious objectors to military service must be exempted from the draft
under the Free Exercise Clause. Even though the Supreme Court has recently
made it easier for the government to infringe on free exercise of religion, the
elaborate system of classifications and exemptions that characterizes the draft
suggests that the government's burden is still to demonstrate a compelling
interest of the highest order before conscientious objectors could be drafted.
Because of the historical success of the exemption, the government could not
meet this burden.
Whether the right to conscientious objection extends to draft registration is
not so clear. Selective Service regulations denying registrants the opportunity
to have their conscientious objections officially recognized strengthens the
argument that registration is a coercive burden on the free exercise of religion.
Furthermore, because registration implicates free speech by requiring objectors
to speak, the government must demonstrate that registration not only serves a
compelling government interest but that exempting conscientious objectors would
make that interest impossible to accomplish.
Because conscientious objectors can be accommodated without seriously
impacting the purposes of draft registration, the government is obligated to
accommodate those beliefs. Of the methods of accommodation available to the
government discussed in this note, the most immediately feasible is for Selective
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Service to administratively register conscientious objectors without requiring
them to personally register. Institution of such a policy would be a reasonable
and inexpensive way to meet military needs without unnecessarily infringing on
the free exercise rights of conscientious objectors.
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